New tendencies in the Turkish center-right: with special reference to the "new" Democrat Party by Çolak, Yılmaz
"viiSiF γ'ητίί· л ^ т ^ 'У т л г З ^ і  - ЛѵГгѵГ·'·"·· w j
Zl: 3ClJuL E3FS5t$MG2 7 0  3 S 2  *’^ ДВ:Р BSiJ0CZ!ü^-T I ΑΙΙΊ'
г -ϊ · „
NEW TENDENCIES IN THE TURKISH CENTER-RIGHT: WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE "NEW" DEMOCRAT PARTY
A Master's Thesis
Submitted to the. Department of Political Science
and
Public Administration 
of
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
by
Yılmaz ÇOLAK
ANKARA 
September, 1994 _^|j[ßo2-..............................
/  u
j a
1 6 0 9
•A «
DU
Н 99Ц
B026400
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, 
in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political 
Science and Public Administration. ^
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre-Sakallioglu
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, 
in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political 
Science and Public Administration.
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, 
in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political 
Science and Public Administration. /
Assist. Ppf./l5r.^^ltem Müftüler
Approved by the Institude of Economic^nd Science
ABSTRACT
NEW TENDENCIES IN THE TURKISH CENTER-RIGHT: WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE "NEW" DEMOCRAT PARTY
ÇOLAK, Yılmaz
M. S. in Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu 
September, 1994, 123 pages
The objective of the present study is to understand the general char­
acteristics of new tendencies in the Turkish centre-right. To accomplish this 
task, the "new" Democrat Party (DP), which is one of the new political 
formations in Turkey, is analyzed through a comparison with two major 
centre-right parties - the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party 
(TPP). By touching upon the some basic concepts of the centre-right politics 
such as economic and political liberalism, conservatism, liberal democratic 
system, this comparison refers to the question of how the Turkish centre-right 
realizes their political ideology and practice. It seems that the "new" DP 
which defends the necessity of liberal-pluralist values at the level of both state 
and society is much closer to the ideology of the centre-right politics than the 
MP and the TPP. Main conclusion drawn from this study is that the traditional 
structure of Turkish politics has been pushed toward a liberal democratic
system by evolving political sentiment within socio-economic and political 
development. In such orientation, the newly emerging political movements in 
the centre-right appear as one of significant, determinant factors.
Key Words: Turkish Centre-Right, New Right, Political Liberalism, Eco­
nomic Liberalism, Conservatism, Neo Conseiwatism, Atatürkism.
IV
ÖZET
TÜRK MERKEZ SAĞINDA YENİ EĞİLİMLER: "YENİ" DEMOKRAT
PARTİ ÖRNEĞİ
ÇOLAK, Yılmaz
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doc. Ahmet İçduygu 
Eylül, 1994, 124 sayfa
Bu çalışma ile amaçlanan, Türk merkez sağında ortaya çıkan yeni 
eğilimleri ve onların genel özelliklerini anlayabilmektir. Bu amaç doğrul­
tusunda, yeni eğilimlerden biri olan Aydın Menderes liderliğinde Büyük 
Değişim Partisinde başlayıp Demokrat Partide devam eden siyasal hareket iki 
büyük merkez sağ parti (Anavatan Partisi ve Doğaı Yol Partisi) ile karşılaştır­
malı bir şekilde tartışılmıştır. Merkez sağ ideolojisinin dayandığı siyasal ve 
ekonomik liberalizm, muhafazakarlık, yeni muhafazakarlık, liberal-çoğulcu 
demokratik sistem gibi temel kavramlar baz alınarak, üç parti arasındaki 
karşılaştırma yapılmaya çalışınılmıştır. Hem devlet hem de toplum sevi­
yesinde ekonomik ve siyasal anlamda liberal değerlerin hakimiyetini savunan 
"yeni" Demokrat Parti, merkez sağ ideolojisine ve değerlerine ANAP ve DYP 
den daha yakın olduğu görülmektedir. Bu çalışmadan çıkarılabilecek temel 
sonuç, 1990 iarda ortaya çıkan yerel ve küresel değişikliklerin etkisi altında 
kalan Türk siyasal sisteminin geleneksel yapısı liberal demokratik bir sisteme
doğru kaymaya zorlanmaktadır. Merkez sağda ortaya çıkan yeni siyasal 
oluşumlar Türk siyasal sisteminin içinde bulunduğu bu süreci etkileyen 
nedenlerden birisi olarak belirmekte.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Merkez Sağı, Yeni Sağ, Ekonomik Liberalizm, Si­
yasi Liberalizm, Muhafazakarlık, Yeni Muhafazakarlık, Atatürkçülük.
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INTRODUCTION
Changes in the international system imply several consequences for the 
nations' political and socio-economic structures. Developments in the last 
decade, such as the collapse of communism and the East Block, the rise of 
globalisation and the emergence of "new world order", have paved the way to 
the rapid and rising process of transformation across the world. This process 
gives us a new declaration: all viable alternatives to liberal democracy has 
now been quite discredited. A consistent theme of such newly emerging 
context is that liberal democracy, which is still gaining ground all over the 
world, is the only plausible form of governance in the modem world, but, in 
accordance with the changing situation, it needs to be redefined and restmc- 
tured. Parallel to that, the roles and functions of political parties started to be 
questioned and discussed because their ideologies and views do not clearly 
interact with the newly reshaping social process and stmcture which compel 
political parties to search new identities and ideologies.
It may be seen that this global transformation has an important and 
effective impact upon the Turkish political and social stmcture. Nowadays, 
Turkish politics suffers from the presence of so many political parties, and 
their failure in providing possible solutions to the problems faced by the 
people and alternative policies, as a result of serious ideological straits. 
Changes in global and local environment might be regarded as one of the 
significant process behind the rise in the number of political parties in Turkey.
Furthermore, fragmentation and polarization in Turkish politics are strongly 
linked with the 1980 military intervention by which the Turkish political 
system have been reshaped, especially in regulating party formation and 
activities. By the late 1980s, the Turkish politics was appeared to be moving 
into a fragmentation reminiscent of the 1970s faced with the emergence of old 
leaders and parties. Such fragmentation, the result of the 1980 coup, gained 
speed in the early 1990s, as the global and local conditions were transformed.
In the same context, personalistic conflicts or intra-elite conflicts seem 
to be other reason that brings about some new political parties come to exist. 
Most of these political parties may be called as "splinter parties"·; yet, splin­
ter parties which did not reflect any kind of cleavage in the electorate have 
always had a rather brief life. In fact, political parties in Turkey have usually 
emerged and developed as a means of elite conflict. For this reason, for a long 
time the basic cleavage in Turkish politics has been a cultural rather than 
socio-economic in nature.
As one of these newly emerging parties, the Democrat Party (DP), De- 
mokrat Parti} was first established by a group of people under the leadership 
of Adnan Menderes who was the leader of the DP until it was banned by the 
military following the 1960 coup d'etat. Later, the DP was re-established in 
May 1993. The "new" DP was joined with the Grand Transformation Party 
(GTP), Büyük Değişim Partisi, led by Aydın Menderes, the son of Adnan 
Menderes, in Febmary 1994. The "new" DP, which entirely accepted the 
program of the GTP, differs to a certain extent from the "old" DP in terms of 
the views on democracy, state, social organisation, etc. Two elements, that are 
globalization of liberal democratic ideas and views and the post-1980 devel­
opments, on the one hand, and personal factors, on the other hand, seem to 
have an effect on the re-emergence of the "new" DP with a new program and 
principles emphasizing pluralist-liberal version of democracy which 
distinguishes the "new" DP from the other present political parties in Turkey. 
Globally and locally changing context may be the most potent reason bringing 
about a new program which compelled the leaders of the "new" DP to renew 
themselves so as to restructure and restore Turkish democracy. At the same 
time, personalistic aspect that one leader steers some people towards forming 
a new political party or shaping a new program for the party is much more 
crucial in the emergence of the "new" DP as an apart political party. Aydın 
Menderes, the leader of the "new" DP, played a determinant role in forming 
new principles and ideology within a new cadre. However, as opposite to the 
other small political parties, the "new" DP does not seem a splinter party from 
a big political party as a result of personalistic and communalistic conflict 
over party or government policy.
Because of its right-wing roots and heritage, the "new" DP can be 
considered as a political party in "center-right" of Turkish politics. Similarly, 
in this study I use the term "center-right" to label two major political parties - 
the Motherland Party (MP), Anavatan Partisip and the True Path Party (TPP), 
Doğru Yo! Partisi.
Nevertheless, some students of the Turkish politics talk about the limi­
ted role of the concepts of "left-wing" and "right-wing" in determining the 
Turkish politics. Mango^ claims that progressives versus religious reactionar­
ies and the western distinction between right-wing and left-wing are inappro­
priate for studying Turkish politics where basic cleavage was cultural rather
than functional. Thus, Turkish politics can be best understood in terms of a 
cleavage among populist or democrats and bureaucrats. This is clearly ex­
pressed through the theoretical construct of "center-periphery cleavage" with 
which change and continuity in Turkish political party life may be conveni­
ently explained.^ In this respect, always at issue was the bureaucratized ver­
sion of Ataturkist thought. Populist or democrats, heavily representing the 
periphery, have continuously attacked on the Kemalist ideas which were 
transformed into an ideology by the bureaucratic elite. At the present day, 
some scholars^ stress that we can not sufficiently understand Turkish political 
structure, especially in the post-1980 era, by looking at the chief cultural 
cleavage between the center and periphery, between traditionalist and 
modernist. As to them, this insufficiency can be explained with socio­
economic factors in stead of political factors. It is because that once periph­
ery came to center, it became one of the basic actors in determining politics. 
They also argue that the rise of the power of civil society and shifting class 
structure are other important aspects causing the insufficiency of old cleav­
ages in understanding Turkish politics. However, it can not be denied the fact 
that such dichotomy has still been to a large extent dominant in Turkish poli­
tics, where the center-right emerged as the representative of periphery, paving 
the way for a new cleavage such as "laik" (secularist) and "müslüman" ( 
Moslem), "Türk" (Turk) and "Kürt" (Kurd), and so on.
The distinction among right-wing and left-wing in Turkish politics 
came into picture as the leaders of the Republican People's Party (RPP), 
Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası, declared their position in the left of center in 1965. 
By this distinction, during the 1970s, the political parties, and even party 
factions, had been regularly formed and reformed around certain ideologies
and counter ideologies. After the left and right distinction was began to be 
used, the line of the DP, the Justice Party (IP), Adalet Partisi, the MP and the 
TPP were classified as the center-right parties. They defined their position in 
accordance with their opposition to their counterpart parties; the RPP, and 
later, in the post-1980, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), Sosyal 
Demokrat Halka Parti, led by Erdal İnönü and now by Murat Karayalçın, the 
Democratic Left Party (DLP), Demokratik Sol Parti, led by Ecevit, and the 
RPP of Deniz Baykal. Beside these centrist political parties, there are also 
some other political parties both in the right-wing and the left-wing. In the 
right-wing there are Erbakan's Welfare Party (WP), Refah Partisi, pro- 
Islamist centrist party, and Turkeş' Nationalist Action Party (NAP), Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi. Moreover, there are some minor parties: Yusuf Ozal's the 
New Party (NP), Yeni Parti, which is splinter party from the MP; the Grand 
Unity Party (GUP), Büyük Birlik Partisi, which separated from the NAP; the 
Anew Birth Party (ABP), Yeniden Doğuş Partisi, of Н. Celal Güzel who was 
the minister of National Education in the governments of Turgut Ozal who 
was the prime-minister from 1983 to 1989 and later he became the President; 
Besim Tibuk's Liberal Party (LP), Liberal Parti, and the Nation Party (NP), 
Millet Partisi In the left-wing there are some radical parties: the Socialist 
Unity Party (SUP), Sosyalist Birlik Partisi, the Labour Party (LP), işçi Partisi, 
and the Socialist Party (SP), Sosyalist Parti.
In a convenient context, in order to designate their position in Turkish 
political and party system, the MP, the TPP and the "new" DP, which do not 
completely share the peculiarities of the center-right in the political literature, 
are labeled as the centre-right parties. However, at the level of general princi­
ples, Turkish centre-right, in some sense, has similarities with the "centre-
right politics", which is closely linked with liberal and conservative views, 
and their new versions: neo-liberalism , neo-conservatism and the new right. 
For that reason, it is necessary to answer the question of how the center-right 
is viewed in the literature of politics that is the subject of the first chapter in 
the present study.
Turkish center-right parties (the DP, the JP, the MP and the TPP) that 
follow liberal and democratic tradition based on the views of Prince Sebahat- 
tin, the Progressive Republican Party (PRP), Terrakkiperver Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası, and the Free Party (FP), Serbest Fırka, played mainly crucial role in 
shaping Turkish politics and in leading democracy to take roots among people 
and in the consolidation of democracy. Following the transition to a multi­
party system, the "old" DP dominated Turkish politics until the military inter­
vention in 1960. It could be seen as a protest movement against the hegemony 
of the bureaucratic elites who perceived democracy as the liberation of the 
intellectual-bureaucratic elite from the absolutism of the majority. Under the 
leadership of the "old" DP's political elites, periphery came to center, and, in 
this way, strong ties among the state and people were established, which hin­
dered the potential conflict among them. In the multi-party era, the "old" DP 
and other center-right parties have challenged the elitist perspective of the 
centralist bureaucratic elite that produced tensions in the political system and 
remained dysfunctional for the development of democratic government. Thus, 
their ultimate aim was to put an end to the domination of the bureaucratic 
elites over the state and the society.
On the contrary, it is not the "old" DP's objective to remove 
Atatiirkism, the official ideology, which has remained as the dominant politi­
cal ideology in the Republican era, but it opposed the bureaucratic elite's 
interpretation of Atatiirkism. The center-right parties interpreted Ataturkism 
in favorable to their views and to suit their purpose. By such interpretation, 
they tried to legitimate their orientation. Furthermore, they did not intend to 
turn away from Atatiirkist secularism and westernization; in this sense, the 
center-right parties, especially the "old" DP in the 1950s, one may assert, 
played a significant part in increasing the legitimacy of Ataturkism in the eyes 
of people. On the other, unlike the Kemalist ideas, they defended the evolu­
tionary transformation of the society rather than revolutionary one, liberal 
economic policies rather than estatist policies, and liberal democracy rather 
than rationalist democracy. Unlike these contradictions, by the changing 
international context, all political parties and groups believe the necessity of 
the free market economy which has been the main economic principle of the 
center-right.
As a result of such consensus on the basic principles of Ataturkism, the 
TPP and the MP, major center-right parties, are acting together and sharing 
same views with the bureaucratic elites and with the left-wing political par­
ties. This agreement is made for preventing threats, originating from social 
and cultural groups basing on certain cultural identities, to the official ide­
ology, Ataturkism. The rise of these social and cultural groups and identities 
might be explained with the idea that during the 1980s and 1990s civil socie­
tal elements started to gain ground and significance. Although both the TPP 
and the MP are largely sterilizing themselves from these groups, the "new" 
DP puts the view that each group in the society has a freedom of assembly 
and association, and a freedom to express and publish their opinions. Here, it 
can be said that the "new" DP depends on the principles of political liberal­
ism, and also it puts forward the idea of "hakem devlet" (the referee-state)^. 
This idea of "hakem devlet" depends upon a form of state which should not 
impose any sort of ideologies or views on people through education or any 
way and it should equally treat all groups. Implicitly, by this claims, the 
"new" DP challenges the nation-state, the Republican regime, lounging 
around on the Ataturkist principles.
Such views of the "new" DP makes possible to distinguish it from two 
major center-right parties: the MP and the TPP. The MP under the leadership 
of Turgut Ozal, however, paved the way for the erosion of Kemalist princi­
ples throughout staiggling by the bureaucratic and centralized structure of the 
state, while it regarded the Ataturkist principles as a necessary phenomena for 
reaching democratic and modem Turkey. In the post-Ozal period, the coali­
tion among four inclinations - liberals, conservatives, nationalists and central­
ists - with which the MP was able to reintegrate the anti-systemic tendencies, 
was ended almost with excluding some groups from the party. Like the MP, 
the JP in the early 1970s and the SDPP in 1992 excluded some anti-systemic 
groups that mn counter to the central-official ideology. In the same way, the 
TPP, the continuation of the JP, existed in a position of legitimizing civilian 
politics and maintaining the issue of democracy in the political agenda from 
1983 to 1992; yet, it is in government, its challenge to the "bureaucratic will" 
and its wish of civilian politics have not yet been put into a practice. Conse­
quently, the problem in the center-right politics appears to be whether or not 
accepting and implementing the requirements of political liberalism. At the 
same time, there are some political parties and movements, emerging mostly 
in the right-wing of Turkish politics, depending upon liberal discourse and 
rhetoric.
The aim of the present study is to compare and contrast the character­
istics of the "new" DP, on the one hand, and those of the MP and the TPP, on 
the other hand, by focusing on their perceptions of pluralist-liberal democ­
racy, economic and political liberalism, and the state. What the differences 
and similarities among these three center-right parties are and so what degree 
their ideologies fit into the center-right politics in the literature of political 
science are the fundamental questions of this study. With the help of this 
comparison, I want to arrive in an understanding of the general characteristics 
of new political movements in Turkish center-right.
In the first chapter, as I noted earlier, a general theoretical framework 
that the western center-right put up will be explained. It includes an elabora­
tion of the concepts of the pluralist-liberal democracy, conservatism, liberal­
ism and the new right, particularly in the case of the United States and the 
United Kingdom. These concepts are applied to clarify the ideology of the 
center-right parties across the world and Turkey.
The second chapter aims to analyse the historical development of the 
Turkish center-right under two subtitles; from 1923 to 1980 in which the PRP, 
the FP, the DP and the JP will be discussed, and from 1980 to now where the 
elaboration of two major center-right - the MP and the TPP - will take place. 
This helps us to understand whether or not there is a center-right tradition in 
Turkey. The third chapter deals with the ideology and party program of the 
"new" DP under the leadership of Aydın Menderes. Throughout this chapter, 
the "new" DP's connection with the GTP, and its views on the state, society, 
democracy, religion, secularism and nationalism will be brought up. The
fourth chapter, which includes some concluding remarks, is about the 
comparison among the "new" DP and two major center-right parties, the MP 
and the TPP, in terms of their main political ideology.
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CHAPTER ONE
DEFINING THE CENTER-RIGHT: 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Turkish center-right has used some basic concepts and terms, such as 
pluralist democracy, free will, conservatism, economic and political liberal­
ism, center-right, etc., in order to define and determine their position and 
ideologies . It is usually argued that these concepts and terms applied by 
Turkish center-right do not reflect social and political reality as it is the case 
for highly industrialized democratic societies. As it is indicated in the Intro­
duction part, this may be made clear with an explanation that Turkish social 
structure and cleavage are substantially different from such societies; in gen­
eral, basic cleavage in Turkey has been cultural, basing upon the center- 
periphery drift, rather than socio-economic or class stmcture. On the contrary, 
one can not reject the fact that Turkish center-right shows in some sense 
similarities with western center-right politics, in terms of accepting the par­
liamentary system, political democratic regime, liberal economic policies, 
some conservative and nationalist views, and so on. In this chapter, a general 
theoretical framework of center-right politics through clarifying the terms and 
concepts used in the political literature will be given. This helps us to under­
stand the meaning of the terms applied by Turkish center-right and to com­
pare Turkish center-right by western one.
In recent years, the rising of the right-wing politics in the world, espe­
cially in the United States and the Great Britain, has been witnessed. This 
may include the center-right movements based on the liberal and conservative 
aspects committed to the parliamentary system , and also the extreme right 
movements glorifying nationalism and opposing doctrines espousing interna­
tionalism. There is also certain right which has traditionally derided the par­
liamentary system, even when it has insisted on the parliament. Here, a 
description about general characteristics of center-right-wing politics and 
emerging new trends in this politics will be given through briefly focusing on 
the United States and the Great Britain, in most cases. It is now generally 
agreed upon that the center-right politics , all over the world, is profoundly 
connected with pluralist-liberal democracy and its parliamentary institutions, 
contrary to all right-wing movements violating these institutions. It is there­
fore necessarily needed to describe pluralist-liberal democratic system and of 
its requirements, which seems to be an inevitable political and socio­
economic system by the center-right politicians.
1. Democracy and Pluralist-liberal Democratic System
Democracy is still far from being the most common form of political 
system, but it is gaining ground across the world. Firstly, it is suitable to start 
with the definition of democracy. Its dictionary definition is simply that de­
mocracy means the rule of the people. It is obvious that only a small minor­
ity of individuals can be rulers in modern societies. So ruling must be taken, 
to a large extent, in terms of choosing the rulers and influencing their deci­
sions.· This dictionary definition clearly reflects most common view that 
ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders. To this 
effect, it is generally assumed that, in a democratic society, there is equality 
of opportunity for all citizens. We can find two forms of democracy- in its 
dictionary definition; one is direct democracy in which the people rule by 
making decisions themselves, and the other form is representative democracy 
in which the people elect a number of representatives to make decisions for 
them. In spite of some exception, like in Switzerland where a kind of direct 
democracy is relatively predominant, representative fonri of democracy can 
be distinctively regarded basic form of democracy accepted throughout the 
most of societies.
Pluralist-liberal democratic system, which exists as a unique form of 
political system, may be dependent on some required principles and charac­
teristics, in general. First one is the ideology of participation in decision­
making that necessitates regular elections, free speech, free association of 
political parties, etc. Other is that, under such circumstances, power should be 
diffused across a wide range of national or local institutions and organisation, 
thus no one group can systematically organize power in own interests. Third 
principle is related with the function of government which should act as 
umpire or referee in order to arbitrate upon the complex demand of heteroge­
neous society , and also there should be ensuring sovereignty of parliament 
over government. It is for this reason that, in the pluralist democratic system, 
the state is seen as a neutral arena in which actors may be able to use in 
attempting to serve their interests. It may thus be seized for use by particular 
interests, possible in a society where the state is largely free from any social 
classes and groups. Finally, political culture of this sort of pluralist demo­
cratic societies must be linked with norms guiding action, including belief of 
the idea of freedom apart from state bureaucratic control, while the state or 
government should be responsible for providing some services provision of 
health, education and welfare facilities according to need.^ Political democ­
racy resulted from such liberal-pluralist democratic system and logically 
embraced by pluralism^ quarantines the civil liberties of all citizens, political 
pluralism, the system of contracts and the principle of representation. It also 
requires a complex set of social institutions or a civil society, which is rela­
tively independent of the state, though never completely.-“'
The essence of democracy still consists of securing the competition of 
interests and the rulés which make their representation possible. As a unitary 
agent of inteiwention and action, the state has dissolved. At this point, it is 
indispensable needed to define the term civil society, at a some extent, in 
order to understand the position of the center-right politics in the West and in 
Turkey. Most common definition of civil society found in the literature 
stresses the existence of a relatively wide range of social sectors ( family, 
groups, voluntary associations and so on) which are autonomous from the 
state. "The activities of such sectors are regulated by various associations 
existing within them; they are not embedded in closed, ascriptive settings; 
they are open ended and overlapping"
A state limited in its power emerges , by and large, as certain main 
condition for political democracy. This situation takes us to the thought that 
'democracy is heavily related with a free market system and a limited state. 
Within an economy of which the state controls the larger portion, someone 
who hold power can easily and deliberately frustrate opposition and retain
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power7 Public spaces which are independent of the institution of government, 
the party system and state staictures are inevitable condition for a kind of 
democracy in which there exist some peculiar "rights to make one's voice 
heard by means of representation or by modifying the conditions of listen­
ing, as well as the right to belong or to withdraw from belonging in order to 
produce new meanings".^
2. Center-Right-Wing Politics
Throughout this part, I will mainly concentrate on the position of the 
center-right after the mid-1970s, starting point of the rising of the right-wing 
politics. This does not, however, mean that the progress of the center-right in 
the preceding period , afterwards of the Second World War, will not be clari­
fied. At the first hand, it is useful to begin with the definition of the concept 
of the Right politically by giving its broader explanation generally agreed 
on. In fact, the term has not absolutely fixed the meaning and it can be used 
relatively. The Right as a concept, used to characterize the conservative end 
of the political spectaim in modem polities, may be defined in part by its 
opposition to its political counterpart, namely the left. While it would be a 
mistake to see the right only as a synonym for conservatives, it may refer to 
political movements, and also may refer to ideas sharing a commitment to the 
advancement of conservative social, political and economic ideas. Advocates 
of the right, under the effect of the conservative views, believe tradition and 
custom as guides to behavior. In addition, unlike liberals and those on the 
left, its conservative principles comprise the veneration of religion, loyalty, 
and a system of social hierarchy.^
The modern advocates of the right-wing consent the capitalist system, 
although some of its proponents look askance at changes associated with 
capitalist development. One of the political scientists clarifies this situation in 
the following way;
AII members o f  the Right share a belief in the importance o f  
private property (together with a legal system) as the foundation 
and enabling condition for political and economic liberty. They also 
share an antipathy to collectivist or political, preferring those based 
in individualism.'
All these definitions until now clear that the center-right should be 
considered together with conservatism and liberalism, in political and socio­
economic sense, after the Second World War. The rise of the right in the late 
1970s and the 1980s was highly related to a large extent with rising new po­
litical movements in the right-wing politics; such as, the new right, neo-con­
servatism, neo-liberalism, and so on. Still, democratic parties by advancing 
arguments of the right are dominant in Western democracies, and they have 
been indicated in eastern and central Europe with the collapse of collectivist 
polities. The conception of the center-right, predominantly used in this thesis, 
may be related in general with conservative and liberal views, and their new 
versions: noe-consei’vative and neo-liberal movements.
2.1. Conservatism and Neo-Conservatism
It is not so easy to describe conservatism and its new form . It is be­
cause of the fact that its meaning and usage can be changed and can be used
for different purposes and for pointing out distinct ideological preferences in 
accordance with many countries and societies. With regard to the United 
States and the Great Britain, which are the symbols of liberal democratic 
system, conservatism will be systematically analyzed. Conservatism as a 
concept may refer either to a political and social attitude, or to a more or less 
well-defined set of political policies designed to preserve best of what has 
been inherited in the light of changing and unanticipated circumstances. That 
is, it seeks the preservation of the literature, institutions, and characteristic 
ways of thinking and doing which have grown up in a nation or culture, and 
offers no prescription for change.''
In classical notion, the conservatives generally emphasized hierarchy 
and negative consequences of economic activity. The conservative, more­
over, desire to maintain social order and authority, require strong central 
governmental authority, and justified the state's provision of basic health care 
and education in terms of precedent.
In order to understand American conservatism one requires to start 
with the historical context in which it emerged in the 1950s. The constellation 
of economic, social and national security themes, defining recent American 
conservatism as a world view, is clear enough. In economics, conservatives 
have stressed freeing the market from the constraints of government; that is, 
less government with more freedom and greater prosperity: cutting taxes, 
domestic spending, and regulation. On social issues, conseiwatives have con­
demned the secular, humanistic bent of American culture and its crucial 
effects on the traditional family, gender roles, religion, and morality. On the 
issue of national security, they drive greater spending on the American mili-
tai7 to counter the Soviet military and power. These three elements of conser­
vatism can be respectively called economic libertarianism, social traditional­
ism and militant anti communism.By the late 1950s, "conservatives gen­
erally agreed that consei'vative was their proper name, not individualist, true 
liberal, or libertarian".
In the 1950s and early 1960s, conservatives moved dramatically from 
an isolationist to an interventionist anti communism, and also they tried to re­
vise their arguments against the growing domestic states and their defense of 
laissez-faire capitalism. For this reason, they attempted to make a moral case 
for capitalism to go along with the utilitarian one. They concerned with the 
philosophical discussion about how to bring together two very different kinds. 
of conservative language: a libertarianism emphasizing individualism and 
freedom, and a traditionalism expressing moral order and community.
Conservatives turned to traditionalist themes to help construct a moral 
defense of capitalism to supplement the utilitarian one which usually 
emerged from libertarianism. In the words of Himmelstein;
By trying to join traditionalism and libertarianism, 
conservative fusion is ts were above all saying that the decline o f 
freedom and pristine capitalism went hand in hand with the decay in 
God and absolute truth. Freedom and fusionist sought to articulate, in 
short, was a religious defense o f  pristine capitalism required a 
religious, moral, spiritual Justification... what the capitalism.^^
In sum, the union of traditionalism and libertarianism come into the 
picture with its traditionalist emphasis on objective moral order and its liber­
tarian stress on private property. Most conservatives accepted to bring to­
gether somehow these two different language criticize domestic collectivism. 
As a result of reconstructive conservative ideology, conservatives "recast their 
defense of pristine capitalism by making a more explicitly moral, rather than 
an economic, case for it. The result was a complicated combination of liber­
tarian and traditionalist themes that remained a hallmark of conservatism into 
the IQROs".'-“^
The progress of American conservatism can be divided into two 
phases: from the late 1950s to the early 1970s the conseiwative movement 
became an effective political movement but failed to make its mark on 
American politics; from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s the movement, in 
the form of new right reached full maturity and became for a time a dominant 
force in the United States politics. The most striking characteristics of the 
new right was its continuity with older conservative movement in leadership 
and ideology as well as to a large extent in strategy and rhetoric. Differences 
between both were usually superficial. Like the older conservative movement, 
new one combined a militant anti communism’with a libertarian defense of 
pristine capitalism and a traditionalist concern with moral and social order.
In the case of the United States, one must mention the neo-conserva­
tive movement which left its mark on American politics since the mid 1970s. 
It is the fact that it was not independent from the new right movement. Neo­
conservatives are a group of former left liberal intellectuals who became more 
conservative as a response to the new left of the 1960s and emphasize the
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necessity of the capitalist free market. They became risingly skeptical about 
the ability of government to solve the problems that it addressed. They also 
fear that the combination of excessive expectations and government failure 
could threaten liberal democratic societies. They advocate the creation of 
moral and political values, the use of a corrected market for the promotion of 
social goals, and the restoration of a pluralist political system.·"^
On the other hand, British conservatism, which is based on the writings 
of Hume and Oakeshott, Burke, Disraeli and Salisbury, Churchill and 
Thatcher, regard the limited character of government the most fundamental 
tenet of the conservative politics. For a conservative in the British tradition, 
political life is not a.project of world improvement, or the constitution of hu­
man institutions on the pattern of any ideal model, but it is something much 
humbler. Any government, which is animated by a conservative outlook , 
takes for granted the imperfectibility of human affairs acknowledged by con­
servatives as a result of ordinary experience and common obseiwation, not any 
metaphysical speculation.’  ^ For over decade, British conservatism has been 
relevant with social and moral conservatism, that Reagan's policies based on, 
through the frequent references to Victorian values in Thatcher's rhetoric.
The policy agenda of British conservatism has been dominated by the 
freeing up the market from the state's regulation. This is strongly related with 
the liberal conseiwatism of Thatcher. There can be no return to the collusive 
corparatism of the 1960s and 70s, forced by the interventionism of post war 
conservatism - interventionist conservatism. Extending market institutions, 
reducing taxation, inflation and government expenditure, and privatizing 
public industries and services have emerged basic target of this conservatism.
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In the Great Britain neo-conservatism has been used to describe the 
revival of traditionalist conservatism which distinguishes itself from the both 
interventionist conservatism and the liberal conservatism of Thatcher. The 
British neo-conservatives emphasize that order is the main concern of conser­
vatism; the reason behind their rejection of both type of conservatism is that;
interventionist conservatism because o f its tendency to 
comprise with the left rather than oppose it, and liberal 
conservatism because o f  its excessive concern with liberty at the 
expense o f  order. There must be a common moral order i f  men are to 
live peacefully together and it is the role o f  government to promote 
and enforce that moral order. · ^
2.2. Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism
As it is defined in a classical sense, the classical political and economic 
liberalism is dependent on a belief in competitive individualism, a reduced 
and controlled role for the state, and a maximization of the market. The econ­
omy and social order will be largely self-regulating , no particular need for 
the state intervention. And so, while liberalism accords a minimum role to the 
state in the operation of the economy and social order, it plays down moral 
order and tradition. Classical liberal conceptions of the role of the state are 
spit out in terms of a principle of "laissez-faire".-·^
The classical liberalism of Adam Smith, sharing the rationalist and in­
dividualist beliefs of the eighteenth century, argued that each individual is
capable of judging his or her own actions. In the economy individual pursuit 
of wealth and self-interest generates a collective prosperity. The great novelty 
of Smith lies in his preference for wealth over virtue. Also, he endorsed as a 
means of his ultimate value-control of arbitrary rule, a limit to the fear which 
governments could impose on their citizens. In Adam Smith's views, the role 
of the state are only to provide very limited publics goods, to provide justice 
and defense, and to engage in educational activities.
Here, the liberal polity is briefly characterized as a community possess­
ing to a high degree the following features: popular constitutional govern­
ment; a diverse society with a wide range of individual opportunities and 
choices; a predominantly market economy; and a substantial strongly pro­
tected sphere of privacy and individual rights. Classical liberalism went into 
decline at around the end of the nineteenth century, and the term liberal be­
came frequently used to describe an interventionist or social liberalism, par­
ticularly in the US and the UK, because of the rise of social liberal and social­
ist ideas; of cultural, economic and technological changes; and of deficiencies 
in classical liberal thought.-’
It can be claimed that, at the end of the twentieth century, liberalism is 
now triumphant. It spreads in the heart of the advanced world because the 
Anglo-Saxon power became successful in the two world wars. Since the late 
1970s much debate has taken place as to whether the class comprise - an ac­
ceptance by the conservatives of welfare and an acceptance by socialist of the 
market - has come unstuck. As Hall indicates, "more particularly, ideologists 
of the radical right such as Hayek and Friedman have been proclaimed as 
the "true" liberals by politicians such as Reagan and Thatcher in an attempt to
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discredit social democracy".-- However, many scholars see both ideologists 
deriving force behind the revival of neo-liberal ideas after the Second World 
War.23
Like the classical meaning of liberalism, neo-liberalism can be 
summarized as the belief that government intervention does not usually work 
and that markets usually do--*. The market - the voluntai'y exchange of goods 
and services - will usually satisfy the wants of individuals more effectively 
than government, or the state. Neo-liberalism differs from classical liberalism;
an individualist order is not free-standing, but depends on 
forms o f  common for its worth and its very, existence...One o f the 
basic needs o f  human beings is membership in a community. Such 
membership will be stable i f  the community is seen to be meeting 
basic human needs through the institutions o f the market and 
others. The morality o f  the market, prizing and rewarding integrity 
and responsibility, is the only morality consistent with the 
reproduction o f a liberal civiHzationi^^
There are three main views in modern liberal thinking. First one is 
Public Choice School explains government failure as a result of the preserve 
effect of the normal pursuit of self-interest in the political realm in contrast to 
the invisible hand in the economic realm. They consider liberty and indi­
vidualism as fundamental values, and public institutions should be designed 
to maximize individual freedom for libertarian reason.3^’ Second one, liber­
tarianism, consisting of the work of Nozick and Rothbard, which represents a 
more extreme form of liberalism shares the liberal commitment to individual
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property-based rights but lobby for a radically reduced state. That is why, 
individuals should have maximum autonomy and freedom.“  ^ While most 
libertarians want a minimum state and some seek its complete abolition, new 
right liberals reject such a view that arguing the need for a state to enforce 
indispensable laws. Finally, the work of F. A. Hayek, one of the important 
representative of neo-liberal school, will be touched upon.. In much of his 
writing, Hayek does make the conceptual link between economic and per­
sonal liberty. He does articulate possibly the economic and political as­
sumptions of liberalism, attacks the post-war trend toward the state interven­
tion whether in economic and welfare activities and opposes the extension of 
the citizenship rights through the society.“*^ For him progress of a society, 
limited by the structure of rules and practices of that society itself, occurs 
toward an evolutionary process of national selection of rules and institutions. 
It is by this criterion, "the identifications of moral rules with necessary re­
straints on human conduct, restraints which make ordered liberty possible, is 
essential to Hayek's dissociation of morality".
Neo-liberalism has been used in the US to refer to a group of politi­
cians and intellectuals associated with the Democrat Party. They are part of 
left-liberalism rather than the revival of classical liberalism, but are less hos­
tile to the market than most left-liberals, their ideas are "vigorous economic 
growth achieved through an industrial policy the co-operation of government, 
business, and labour; support for innovation and technology; investment in 
education and training; national service...".-^®
Consequently, liberalism, within its new versions, requires a context 
where market forces creates the ideal conditions for individual and political
liberty. The extent of the state provision of services must be carefully speci­
fied and deliberately minimized. While the post-war Keynesian welfare con­
sensus requires an interventionist state, liberalism implies a minimal state.
2.3. The New Right
The term New Right that refers to the entire collection of conseiwative 
and neo-conservative movement, and liberal and neo-liberal movements has 
gained usage since the mid-1970s in a number of advanced industrial democ­
racies, especially in the US and the UK. In both countries, advocates of new 
right arguments had been active since the early 1960s; yet it was in the wake 
of the 1973-74 economic crisis, and the electoral success of Thatcher (1979) 
and Reagan (1980). Then, this term became commonplace. The various com­
ponents of the new right, first appearing in Western Europe and North Amer­
ica, were both a response to the growing intellectual crisis of socialism and a 
reformation of other ideologies, notably classical liberalism. In the new right 
movements, there are two broad groups - noe-liberal and neo-conservative - 
each containing many particular groups.
the
King explains the meaning of the term new right in ^ following way;
The term New Right refers to a range o f conservative and 
liberal ideals including principally a commitment to individual 
freedom and the primacy o f the free market in preference to state 
policy. These fundamentals become the basis for policies such as 
privatizing the public sector, deregulation, reducing the welfare
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State, monetarist macroeconomics measures, and, in some cases, a
conservative moralism} ’
FurtheiTnore, the ideas of the new right necessitates the abrogation of 
social citizenship and its implication through promoting property rights as the 
most valid form of citizenship right. The new right advocates thus believe 
that inequality is a prerequisite for societal development and progress.
These principles gave rise to two different approaches in politics. The 
first includes those who defend traditional liberal values of personal freedom, 
market process and minimal government. These liberal new right theorists 
believe that political and economic freedoms are most important values that 
can be realized in the polity. That is, liberal political and economic tenet as 
the core of the new right is the superiority of market mechanisms as a pro­
moter both of economic prosperity, and of the maximization of individual 
freedom through limiting of the state intervention. The second new right 
promotes the conservative values of inequality, social hierarchy, and tradi­
tional moralism. According to this approach, many aspects of the welfare 
state have encouraged a breakdown of traditional values such as commitment 
to· the family and religion.^-
The origins of the ideas of new right theorists and activists are not es­
pecially new, enjoying a lineage with pre-industrial conservative belief and 
nineteenth-century liberalism whereas such ideas were displaced from the 
political agenda of western democracies during the first three decades follow­
ing the Second World War since social democrats captured the political in­
itiative. Later, since the mid-1970s, the new right has had considerable sig­
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nificance in Western democracies and in displacing social democracy. To 
solve the problems resulted from economic crisis, the political thought of the 
new right contained a powerful analysis of government failure in the western 
democracies.
In both British and American societies, the term new right directly re­
lates with the desire to reduce the role of state and to maximize market proc­
esses which lead to public policies, such as privatization. Moreover, it effec­
tively locates a constellation of committees, centers and institutes committed 
to opposition to the expanded state of the post-war period and restoration of 
individualism. The American New Right contributed to the victory of Reagen 
and influenced his administration's policy decisions subsequently. Similarly, 
the British New Right played major role in shaping the direction of the 
Thatcher leadership and government.^^ Both leaders - Reagen and Thatcher - 
had significant effect on Ozal's policies, especially primacy of free market 
economy, privatization, giving priority to individuals, and other, in the 
1980s.
What are differences and similarities between the British New Right 
and the American New Right, in terms of their policies and implementations ? 
British usage of the term New Right is considerably based upon liberalism 
which is the source of the New Right economic and political theories and pol­
icy objectives. However, conservatism only provides a set of residual claims 
to cover the consequences of pursuing the liberal policies; for example, liberal 
objective of reducing public welfare provision implies a traditional role for 
women and the family; conservatism provides an ideology justifying such 
outcomes from public policy.34 in British conservative doctrine of the New
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Right, unlike American one, the social and moral conservatism has been less 
powerful and played minimal role in the decision-making process. The New 
Right is largely synonymous with Thatcherism that combines Toryism - 
nation, family, authority, traditionalism - with liberal political economy- self- 
interest, competitive individualism and anti-statism. This seems to be identi­
cal with the act of American conservative combining traditionalism and liber­
tarianism in the 1950s and 60s, and after the mid-1970s.
In the United States, the main characteristics of the New Right was its 
continuity with the older conservative movement in leadership and ideology 
as well as in strategy and rhetoric. Difference between the two is usually 
superficial. Still, it combined a militant anti-communism with a libertarian 
defense of pristine capitalism and a traditionalist concern with moral and 
social order. Unique features of the ideology of the New Right, however, 
were the emphasis on social issues, and the adoption of supply-side of eco­
nomics that was a substantive departure from conservative ideology. Corpo­
rate Conservatism, that remained an important political force as the Reagen 
years ended, and the New Religious Right, remained limited in scope of its 
influence in both Reagen and Bush era, are other significant right movements. 
New Right, intellectual conservatives and religious activists together - the 
New Religious Right - provided an important part of the groundwork for 
Ronald Reagen's successful presidential candidacy in 1980.
In the United States, the "New Paradigm" as a guiding theory of the 
New Right is regarded as the brain of the policies of Regan, pickled in the 
brine of an approach to social policy. What is the New Paradigm ? It includes: 
free market and free enterprise; decentralization', choice of consumers; em-
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powcrm ent, and pragmatism  that public service provision should be guided 
by what works, not by ideological d o g ma . Th e  American New Right, or 
American neo-conseiwatives, have an agenda that is currently being associ­
ated with the rise of the moral majority and some former liberal and leftist 
disenchanted intellectuals, as contradictory to the British one.
Both the Thatcher and Reagen governments sought to push their 
respective political economies toward increased reliance upon the market 
sector; it is for this reason that they sought to shift public spending away from 
public welfare services. An obvious example of this is the Thatcher Gov­
ernment's vigorous pursuit of the privatization of many areas of public owner­
ship. It seems to be logical implication of New Right economic principles to 
reverse the post-war trend through increased state-based activity in place of 
market-based activity. Both the Labour Party in Britain and the Democrats 
in the United States have been placed on the defensive by the spread of the 
arguments of New Right and have been forced to revised their own programs.
In short. New Right ideas , it can be said, have had considerable influ­
ence on public policy in western democracies. The policy of reducing public 
sector through privatization and deregulation has become a general one. 
Many western democracies have engaged in extensive privatization programs, 
and this strategy has extended to the new democracies of Eastern and Cen­
tral Europe. Thus, the New Right ideas have in important ways achieved 
dominance in the intellectual arguments informing public policy in western 
democracies.
30
NOTES
•For details, see Antony H. Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modem De­
mocracy ( 1986), pp. 17-18.
-See, Keith Graham, The Battle o f  Democracy: Conflict, Consensus and the 
Individual, 8Sussex: Wheatshaf Books, 1986), p. 16.
^See, Mike Riley, Power, Politics and Voting Behaviour ( New York and 
London; Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 8, and Stephen L. Elkin, 
"Pluralism in Its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy", in The 
Democratic State, ed by R. Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (Lawrence, 
Kansas: the University Press of Kansas, 1985), pp. 179-213.
4por the definition of pluralism made by Dahl, see Birch, p. 165.
-‘'John Keane, Civil Society and the State, ( London and New York: Verso, 
1988 ), p. 26.
^S. N. Eisenstadt, "Introduction", in Democracy and Modernity, ed. by S. N. 
Eisenstadt, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), p. xi.
“^Seymour Martin Lipset, "Conditions of the Democratic Order and Social 
Change: A Comparative Discourse", in Democracy and Modernity, ed. by S. 
N. Eisenstadt, ( Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 13-14.
^Alberto Meluci, "Social Movements and the Démocratisation of Everyday 
Life", in Civil Society and the State, ed. by John Keane (London and New 
York: Verso, 1988), p. 258.
31
^On definitions, see Desmond King, "Right", in The Oxford Companion to 
Politics o f  the World, ed. by Joel Krieger, (New York and Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 790-91; and David Robertson, "The Right", in A 
Dictionary o f  Modern Politics, Second Edition, ed. by Nigel Asford and 
Stephen Davis, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 45.
'OKing, p. 791.
"Norman Bariy ,"Consei'vatism", in A Dictionary o f Conservative and Lib­
ertarian Thought, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis, (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 45.
' “Jeremy L. Himmelstein, To the Right: The Transformation o f American 
Conservatism, (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 13-14.
'^Ibid, p. 26.
'4lbid, p. 59.
'-‘'Ibid, p. 61.
'Olbid, pp. 63,85,86.
'^See, N. Ashford, "Neo-conservatism", in A Dictionary o f Conservative and 
Libertarian Thought, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991), p. 185. Also, see Tomislav Sunic, Against 
Democracy and Equality: The European New Right, (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1990), p. 15.
32
'^.lohn Gray, Beyond the New Right, (London and New York: Routledge, 
1993), pp. 46-47.
■^ N. Ashford, pp. 184-5.
-^On the definition of the classical liberal understanding, see King, p. 10; 
Himmelstein, p. 56; Gray, p. 6; and .lohn A. Hall, "Liberalism", in' The Ox­
ford Compiinion to Politics o f the World, ed. by .loel Kriger, (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 539.
“‘William A. Galston, "Liberal Virtues", American Political Science Review, 
vol. 82, no. 4, December 1988, p. 1281.
2=îHall, p. 541.
“^N. Ashford, "Neo-liberalism", in A Dictionary o f Conservative and Liber­
tarian Thought, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 185.
24Gray, p. 120.
-^‘'Ibid, pp. 122-23.
“^King, p. 12; and Ashford, p. 186.
“”^King, p. 13.
33
“^Norman P. Barry, "The Road to Freedom: Haiku's Social and Economic 
Philosophy", in Hayck'te Serbest Piyasa Ekonomisi ve Özgür Toplum, Anap 
Bilimsel Yayınlar Dizisi-3, (Ankara, 1993), p. 75.
-"■^ Bari'y, p. 72.
•^^Ashford, p. 186.
^•Desmond King, "New Right", in The Oxford Companion to Politics o f  the 
World, ed. by J. Kriger, ( New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), 
p. 631.
3^King(1993), p. 631.
^^See, Martin Durham, "The New Right, Moral Crusades and the Politics of 
the Family", Economy and Society, vol. 22, no. 2, May 1993, p. 254.
34King(1985), p. 25.
-^‘'See, Max Sawicky, "Whafs NEWP? A Guiding Theory of the New Right", 
Social Policy, Winter 1992, pp. 7-9.
34
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH CENTER-
RIGHT
In this chapter, development of the Turkish center-right will be ana­
lyzed from historical perspective. I already mentioned the general character­
istics of the center-right politics. Here, brief history of Turkish center-right 
and their ideas will be aiven.
The fundamental political cleavage in the late Ottoman and early Re­
publican era can be described as a center-periphery drift. Until the 19th 
century, in the Ottoman empire this center-periphery drift had been among the 
incumbents of the Ottoman institutions and people who excluded from the 
state. During the 19th century this cleavage was complicated with another 
one which resulted from the efforts of westernization which ended the old 
intra-elite unity and produced a new conflict. Under such circumstances, the 
Young Ottomans who played crucial role in the reforms of Tanzimat ending 
in the first constitutionalist period were the constitutionalist and autocratic. 
The democratic experiment of the second constitutionalist period (1908-1918) 
was dominated by the Society for Union and Progress, Jttihat ve Terrakki 
Partisi. The Unionists were simply called nationalist, authoritarian, modernist, 
centralist and statist. Because of these characteristics of the Unionist, they
were against three types of political groups. First one was the liberals who 
favored parliamentary democracy, administrative decentralization, more 
reliance upon the private initiative, and more Ottomanist policy (a policy 
aimed at creating an "Ottoman" identity around the common fatherland and 
dynasty). Second was the religious traditionalists who were opposed to the 
secularist aspects of the Unionist policies. Last one was the non-Turkish 
minorities.' For our study, the opposition of the liberals is much more 
significant than other opposition groups because this opposition was seen 
again in the early years of the Republic as the Progressive Republican Party 
which opposed the statist, centralist, revolutionist attitude of the People's 
Party. In other words, the People's Party maintained the tradition of the 
Society for Union and Progress. In the early years of the Republic, the Free 
Party was another political party which partially defended the views of the 
liberals.
With the transition to a multi-party system the Democratic Party tried 
to carry out the values of liberal-democratic tradition connected with the 
views of Prince Sebahattin, the PRP and the FP. In fact, the DP was not able 
to free from the legacy of the single party period; for example, its perception 
of the state was not different from the RPP. That is, it was not successful to 
implement liberal policies. Like the DP, the Justice Party did not apply the 
liberal economic and political policies, despite existing some liberal ideas in 
its initial program in the early 1960s. One may express that Turgut Ozal's 
Motherland Party was the first center-right party which tried to apply the 
liberal economic policies. Consequently, Turkish politics in the late Ottoman 
period and in the Republican era has obviously experienced a sort of dualistic 
character: statist, centralist and positivist values, on the one hand; and liberal.
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pluralist and conservative-traditionalist values, on the other hand. However, 
the political parties that asserted to base on the liberal and conservative 
aspects have not fully escaped from the centralist and positivist characteristics 
of the Ottoman-Turkish legacy.
1. The Turkish Center-Right: From 1923 to 1980
1.1. The Progressive Republican Party
The Progressive Republican Party (PRP), Terrakipperver Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası, had a veiy important place in the formation of a center-right tradition 
in Turkey, as the first organized political party, center-right party. The PRP 
that was the short-lived party was founded in November 1924 by a number of 
leaders of the War of Independence - Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir, Refet 
Bele, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Cafer Tayyar, Adnan Adıvar - aftermath of some 
reforms such as the declaration of Republic, the abolition of Caliphate, and so 
on. In the years after 1923 the nationalist movement evolved into a movement 
with a far reaching goal of radically transforming Turkish society and culture. 
At the same time, plural political structure of such movement paved the way 
gradually to a monolithic power structure which was dominated by the radical 
wing of the movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. This change 
involved the elimination of rival power centers within the nationalist 
movement and, in several cases, these showed some resistance . The most 
serious resistance, potentially dangerous to M. Kemal's position, vvas the 
formation of the PRP, earnestly challenging to the Kemalists until it was
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closed under the Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (Law on the Maintenance of Order) 
in June 1925.
Erik Jan Zürcher, in his study of the Political Opposition in the Early 
Turkish Republic, proves that the main reason for the PRP's opposition was 
that its founders and leaders were fully convinced that they had as much right 
and legitimacy to govern Turkey as M. Kemal and his "new" men. For 
prominent nationalist leaders, the heritage of the movement "was being mo­
nopolized illegitimately by one guardian of the true traditions of the move­
ment".- Also, they declared that they opposed to personal rule (Şahsi Sal­
tanat), an obvious reference to M. Kemal's personal ascendancy, and attacked 
the anti democratic and authoritarian tendencies of the government.
However, the clash of personalities is not itself enough to explain the 
emergence of the PRP's opposition. It was also much more: it was a fun­
damental clash of world views. The men who formed the PRP preferred 
continuity in contrast to the revolutionary approach of the Kemalists; that is, 
the PRP wanted Islahat (reiorm) rather than //t/r/A?/? (revolution). Furthermore, 
they were against to the centralization of power envisaged in the Kemalist 
program and proposed local initiative involving the people in their own affairs 
as the vital ’step towards democracy.^
Both in the PRP's manifesto and program, the party advertised itself as 
liberal. In its manifesto, it emphasized economic and, particularly, political 
liberalism by which the will of people had to be expressed continuously. 
Although this could be done partially through public opinion and the press, 
this was not effective enough. The real solution is the formation of competing 
political parties. In this way the manifesto stated its opposition to despotism.
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and stressed individual rights, judicial independence, and administrative 
decentralization. In the general principles of its program , Turkish state is a 
Republic based on the sovereignty of the people. In short, liberalism and 
democracy form the basis of its actions, supporting general and individual 
liberties, promising a reduction in the role of the state, and establishing clear 
separation of powers. In the chapter of its program on social policies which is 
a good example of its decentralization, welfare is the responsibility of the 
municipality and city districts, but that the fulfillment of this responsibility to 
be found in supporting and encouraging private initiative. The emphasis is 
clearly on solidarity through charitable and mutual help organizations, not 
state interference.It is on all these points that there is a clear difference of 
emphasis among the PRP's program and manifesto, on the one hand, and the 
RPP's policies, on the other hand.
The label "post-independence conservative" is quite adequate for the 
PRP. Frey has argued that there lay "conservative aim of making the new 
Turkey conform as far as possible to the customs and traditions of the old 
change was to be gradual and evolutionary, not swift and revolutionary in the 
Kemalist mode".-'' They were conservative only in the sense of being the 
conservative wing of the same Young Turk/nationalist movement, of which 
Kemalists formed radical wing.
1.2. The Free Party
The Free Party (FP), Serbest Firka, was the second important opposi­
tion party of the Republic. The experiment with the FP came about, as a result
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of several reasons and conditions emerging in the late 1920s. The reforms that 
took place during the period of 1922-30 brought about some sort of 
antagonism to the government and the regime. Moreover, bad economic 
conditions, substantially affected by the world economic crisis in 1929, and 
continuing rebellions in Eastern Anatolia greatly added to the discontent 
which threatened to an important degree the Republic and its reforms. Under 
such circumstances, the FP was established by Fethi Okyar with the en­
couragement of M. Kemal who urged others to join it, including his sister. 
The choice of Fethi Okyar and the selection of other FP leaders were possible 
because they were not challengers to M. Kemal. It is generally accepted that 
the purpose of establishing this party was to air the accumulated discontent 
and to control existing social opposition.* ’^
M. Kemal did not only determine the people who founded the FP, but 
also the nature of the FP's program. Its program consisted of several points, 
such as republicanism, secularism and liberalism; direct elections; abolition of 
monopolies, tax reductions and a free exchange; and importation of foreign 
capital. The main objective of the FP was to oppose the RPP and to criticize 
its failure in the economic field. This attracted to it immediately a large group 
of enthusiastic followers who courageously supported’ the party. Growing 
popularity of the FP and its criticism of the government were interpreted by 
the Republicans not only as a threat to their own rule, but to that of the regime 
itself. In the eyes of government, this support came chiefly from reactionaries. 
M. Kemal and the RPP justified abolition of the FP, which was dissolved by 
its leader in November 1930, by alleging that it had become the vehicle for 
counter-revolutionaries. Consequently, the objective of founding the FP, one 
may argue, was not to pass to democratic system through compromising the
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single party system. The FP which had some similarities by the PRP, 
especially in terms of economic policies, prepared the ground for the 
Democratic Party, established in 1945 and dominating Turkish politics in the 
1950s.
1.3. The Democrat Party
The transition to multi-party politics started in 1946 when the RPP 
regime allowed the formation of opposition parties. The reasons that stood 
behind the decision of passing to multi-party system were the favorable in­
ternational environment following the victory of the democratic regimes in 
the Second World War, the long tradition of westernization that implied 
democratization, and the social unrest due to wartime shortages and profi­
teering.
The Democrat Party (DP), Dem okrat Parti, which was the most signifi­
cant and infiuential opposition party was founded on 7 January 1946 by four 
prominent parliamentarians of the RPP - Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat 
Köprülü and Refik Koraltan. Only four years after its establishment, the DP 
came to power with an overwhelming electoral victory on 14 May 1950, and 
also it won the 1954 and 1957 elections. After remaining in power for ten 
years, it was ousted by the military on 27 May 1960.
The DP as a coalition of various types of oppositions to the RPP 
brought together urban liberals and religious conservatives, commercial 
middle class and the urban poor, etc. Such heterogeneity of the DP coalition
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claimed that "the dominant social cleavage of the era was cultural rather than 
socio-economic in nature. The common denominator of the DP supporters 
was their opposition to the state officials".^ In this sense, it shares some 
similar characteristics with the PRP which emerged because of the cultural 
cleavage and the world view differences, and both share the views on liberal 
economic and democratic policies. Unlike the PRP, the DP was permitted to 
be established with a limitation that it would respect AtatCirkist principles.*^
The specific issues put forward by the DP in general involved the high 
cost of living, lack of freedom, the existence of anti-democratic laws, and 
some abuses by the government. It is because that the Democrats saw the 
concept of democracy as a panacea for almost any problem, from tax 
inequality to gendarmerie pressure. For them it would take root in the daily 
life of the people. In its four years in power, the DP aimed at advancing 
democracy with preventing government interference and with rising indi­
vidual freedoms. However, in the later years, because of the failure of 
economy, a number of freedoms were limited - some measures against to 
opposition taken - in order to achieve peace and stability. Beside the eco­
nomic failure, the DP's perception on the state which was not so different 
from the RPP is another factor responsible for the failure of democracy. Like 
the RPP, it considered all institutions to be at the service of the party in 
power; here, it did not oppose to the transcendentalist state. They differed 
greatly from each other in their perspectives to the role of the state, bu­
reaucracy, private enterprises, and local initiative. The lack of political culture 
conducive to a democratic government was third factor. It may be seen that 
the legacy of the single-party period continued to influence the DP's attitude, 
such as intolerance towards political opposition.*^
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As it has been noted above, political conflict between the RPP and the 
DP emerged as difference of attitude in terms of values and norms. In this 
respect, Islam was seen as the most potent issue. The DP government, which 
itself became associated by the resurgence of Islam, permitted wider grounds 
for religious practice and education, without compromising Atatiirkist's 
reforms.'" Throughout much appealing towards religion and other symbols, it 
emerged to be such a party that fought to hinder the domination of the 
bureaucratic state over civil society. The conflict among the DP and the 
bureaLicracy, which retained its RPP loyalties under multi-party politics and 
resisted the DP's efforts to consolidate its political power, was the perhaps 
most significant factor leading to the breakdown of the democratic regime.
1.4. The Justice Party
After the 1960 military intervention, Ragip Gümüşpala, Şinasi Osma, 
Tahsin Demiray, Mehmet Yorgancıoğlu, Cevdet Perin participated in the 
establishment of a new party which would be a continuation of the Democrat 
Party. Only four of the eleven founders of the party had any relations with the 
DP. The Justice party (JP), A dalet Partisi, was set up in 1960, and Gümüşpala 
became its chairman. As one of the three political parties - the Justice Party, 
the Nation Party (NP), M illet Partisi, and the New Turkey Party (NTP), Yeni 
Türkiye Partisi - competing to the successors to the Democrats, the Justice 
Party won only 3'5 percent of the votes in the 1961 elections. Following a 
period of unstable coalition governments, the JP gradually established itself as 
the principle heir to the DP. In the elections of 1965, it gained an absolute
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majority and formed a government under the leadership of Süleyman 
Demirel. In spite of the decline of its votes, in 1969, it retained its absolute 
majority in the Assembly and continued to be in power until the military 
forced .IP government to resign in March 1971. While its votes decreased by 
fully one-third in the 1973 elections, the .TP remained the dominant party of 
the center-right; then, it returned to power as a series of Demirel-led 
coalitions, after the short-lived RPP-NSP (National Salvation Party) coalition 
of 1973-4.
The support received from a number of influential groups seemed to be 
major factor in the success of the .IP in its formative years. A body of former 
officers and DP members became actively involved in its foundation. In turn, 
for Demirel, the .IP was a mass party which represent the interests of all class- 
city dwellers and villagers, workers and employers. For example, the .TP 
aimed at representing the interest of both industrial workers and businessmen: 
it was able to do this successfully.” Furthermore in the 1960s it took some 
supports among persons not wholly committed to the secularism and 
westernisation principles of Atatiirkism. The coalition on the right based on 
the periphery, that was forged first by the DP and followed by the JP, showed 
signs of breaking down during the late 60s and early 70s, and so the situation 
to the right of the .TP was more fragmented. Emerging religious and nationalist 
movement in addition to the personalistic type of leadership aided by such 
fragmentation.
The .IP and its Democrats predecessor were identified in the 1950s and 
1960s more with liberal and pro-private enterprise policies, while the RPP 
leaned toward estatism, emphasizing the leading role of the state in economic
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development. The JP always accorded an important role to the private sector, 
and also its liberal anti-statism was stronger than that of the DP. In its 
programmatic theme, the private sectors and free-market economy were 
regarded as necessary for a democratic regime; the public sector may start 
when the private sector end. However, as it came to power, the share of the 
governmental sector in economy was not limited and the state economic 
enterprises continued to powerfully ex i s t . At  that point, it may be regarded 
to be a pragmatic party. Following years of its government, the JP thus 
gradually arrived at the idea of mixed economy. Furthermore, the JP as a 
center-right platform was identified mainly with business and modernized 
agrarian interest. Like the DP in the 1950s, the JP in the 1960s and 70s 
continued to represent peripheral discontent with the policies of modernizing 
bureaucratic-intellectual elite during the single-party period. Because it was a 
party based on political will, the JP was anathema to the bureaucracy which 
had already received quite a big share of power, thanks to the 1961 
constitution. As the opposite of the DP, it was very cautious in its relations 
with the military. For instance, in order to show the good will to military, the 
JP-dominated parliament elected Cevdet Sunay the President of the Republic 
and Demirel turned the National Security Council (NSC) into an active tool in 
eveiyday politics. At the same time, the JP skillfully used patronage and 
clientelistic ties in its grassroots organisation inherited from the strong DP 
organisation. During the 1970s, it was a ideologically pivotal party, while it 
was weaker than before. Ideological differences between the JP and the RPP 
were so great, creating hostility among two parties, and among electorates.
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2. The Center-Right of Turkey in the Post-1980 
2. 1. The Motherland Party
The Motherland Party (MP), Anavatan Partisi, one of the major center- 
right parties, unexpectedly came to power after 1980, having achieved 
impressive results in the parliamentary elections of 1983. In the present part, 
an attempt will be made to explain the position and ideology of the MP in the 
center-right context under three subtitle: (1) The MP under Ozal Leadership, 
(2) Post-Ozal Era, and (3) Party policies and Ideology.
2. 1. 1. The MP under Ozal Leadership
The MP under the leadership of Turgut Ozal was formed by a group of 
founders who primarily came from the private enterprises and took part in the 
lower echelons of the pre-1980 centrist and extremist political parties. 
Throughout cutting across the old cleavage of the right and perhaps extending 
into the center-left, it brought about the development of a new cleavage in 
Turkish politics. Therefore, it has been mostly come on the scene as the 
coalition of the four inclinations: liberals, conservatives, nationalists and 
centrists. Various groups coming from different social strata may be added to 
these inclinations. To a large extent this coalition of Ozal's MP was similar 
with the coalition led by the DP which was especially successful in molding a 
coalition of different economic, cultural and social interests existing in the 
periphery. Such structure of the MP assisted in neutralizing and reintegrating 
the anti-systemic tendencies on the right and the periphery, including so many 
members of the National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Nationalist Action
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Party (NAP). The synthesis of four inclination provided by the MP closely 
related with a sort of consensus on some targets and opinions such as free 
market economy, protecting the traditional values, free will, and so on.*‘^
Turgut Ozal, the leader of the MP from 1983 to 1989, was close to the 
.lustice Party and its leader, Demirel. Ozal himself served under Demirel - the 
prime minister of JP governments - with his capacity on several occasions, in 
1969 as the Director of the State Planning Organisation and in 1979 as the 
economic adviser of Prime Minister. In addition, because his brother was one 
of the influential member of the NSP, he was related to the NSP in a way that 
he was contested in 1977 on its Izmir list. It is for the reason that Ergiider 
defines Ozal's position in Turkish politics, before 1980, somewhere between 
the moderate and more secular right of the JP, and the religious right of the 
NSP.'-*'
There are so many reasons behind unexpected victory of the MP in the 
1983 elections. At the first hand, the success of the MP appears to be associ­
ated with the tendency of masses' commitment to free elections linked with 
better living standards and the dramatic socio-economic development in the 
eyes of the people. The Turkish electorate had already searched for a new 
centrist solution to the diseases of the party system in order to achieve regime 
stability. However, instead of ideological polarization of the electorate, the 
Turkish electorate preferred the stable government and efficient delivery of 
services and solution of the problems. The MP seemed to have sensed this 
centrist and pragmatic leaning of the Turkish electorate. The MP leadership 
responded this characteristics of the electorate with its conciliatory and 
moderate style of politics. As Ergiider put it.
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The MP may havti emt^rged as a new, taking advantage o f  the 
vacuum created by the absence o f the old parties and the yearning o f  
the electorate fora democratic and relatively grassroots center- 
right alternative, given the choice they had in 19P3. By steering clear 
o f ideological and partisan conflict and by addressing new sets o f  
issues in a changing and urbanizing Turkey, the MP seemed to have 
become a major party o f  the right, despite the strong opposition from 
the old guard o f Turkish poHtics.^ '^'
Moreover, Ozal projected himself as a qualified technician turned to 
politics, who knows the rational formulas of Turkey's problems and is ready 
to implement them without any political considerations. Explaining its posi­
tion through using modern channels of communication (TV, press, advertis­
ing) is another basic factor paving the way to its success in the elections of 
1983. In TV it cast an image of an economically developing country.
The MP had significance in providing "softening of political conflict" 
and in creating "policy-oriented dialogue"*'  ^ in the post-1980 political life. It 
thus emphasized on a tolerance, conciliatory style of politics and moderation 
rather than polarized and non-conciliatory politics of the pre-1980. This new 
type of politics caused the conflict and criticism over policies rather than 
ideological conflict or systemic and anti-systemic conflict. Other major 
attempt at the reform by the MP was to give more autonomy and power to 
local government and especially to municipalities, through which it tried to 
reduce the burden of bureaucracy on the people. This attempt to localization 
has been one of the most potent aim of the center-right from the beginning; 
for example, the idea of localization tended to be a dominant in the initial
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program and manifesto of the PRP, the first organized center-right party. It is 
because that localization has been considered to be the first step for reaching 
liberal democracy. Its emphasis on delivery of services to the citizen made 
the well-conducted campaign to show the relationship between taxes and 
seiwice deliveiy. This was other reason which open up the place for the MP at 
the center-right of Turkish politics.
The economic policy of the MP combined with an economic ration­
ality, communicating with the masses to explain the rationality behind policy 
decision, a commitment to reduce inflation to reasonable levels, strengthening 
economically the "main pillar" (orta direk), securing economic growth and 
prosperity. Economic policy of the MP responded market signals through an 
emphasis on exports and internationalization of Turkish economy, in contrast 
to the unquestioning preference of the earlier periods for import substitution. 
This means that, unlike former center-right parties, the MP made possible 
shifting a state-dominated economy to an export-oriented free market 
economy where the state would be cut down in size. Also, this represents an 
effort to divorce economic policy from decisions and priorities depended 
upon the patron-client relations which was associated by the politics of the DP 
and the JP. The privatization policy of the MP was a crucial try for cutting 
down the size of the state in economy within which it was aimed to safeguard 
the State Economic Enterprises against political patronage.·^ In practice, the 
governments of the MP heavily invested in infrastaictural development and 
tourism, realized with the help of borrowing abroad that gave headache to its 
government after the mid-1980s.
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In the constitutional referendum, held on the issue of lifting the ban on 
the political activities of the pre-1980 political leadership in 6 September 
1987, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and the MP actively campaigned against 
lifting the ban. In short term, it was useful for the MP, but, in long term, it 
would indicate that its support of conciliatory politics and its commitment to 
democratic values was eroding, and also, it signaled that the MP leadership 
was going away from the conciliatory and moderate style of politics on a 
basic political rights.
In the 1987 elections, the MP won a majority of the seats and remained 
in power because it was successfully adopted the winning formula of the DP- 
JP, based on an effective policy performance. After this elections, the TPP of 
Demirel became to be major obstacle for the MP regaining the dominant posi­
tion on the right of the political spectaim. Beside that the challenge of 
increasing rates of inflation, that coupled by the declining growth rate, 
appeared to be other reason behind the decline of the electoral support for the 
MP government.
By the end of 1986 and early 1987, Turkey witnessed the rise of party 
competition and fragmentation in the right because of the emergence of old 
parties and leaders of the right. To maintain its position the MP therefore 
resorted to the same economic policy measures popular at election time, as in 
the 1970s: higher agricultural support prices and heavy spending in 
constituencies, which led to thé rise of economic deficiencies and problems. 
Here, it might be asserted that this policies caused the re-emergence of the 
patron-client relations, excessive expenditures at election time to win, and a 
less conciliatoi7 attitude toward the press and the opposition.
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The local elections on 6 March, 1989, was seen as the most important 
sign of trouble for the MP which was able to capture a mere 21.8 percent of 
the votes whereas the TPP strengthened its position and manifested to be an 
alternative of the MP. As a result of such failure, the issue of searching new 
image and a return to the spirit of 1983 started to be openly discussed, so that 
cracks in the coalition of four inclinations began to emerge.
In 1989 Ozal era in the MP was ended by his election as the President 
of the Republic. Sometimes described as "Moslem technocrat", Ozal seemed 
to appeal to traditional values without giving them ideological pre-eminence 
over the need to bring Turkey into the international competitive market place. 
In this respect, a comparison to R. Reagen and M. Thatcher is not out. of 
place. Reagen's appeal to Christian values, anti-abortion interests, etc., 
enables him to absorb traditional elements of the electorate without sacrificing 
his prime emphasis on modern issues which are the market over the state, 
investment and growth over income maintenance, and so on. Likewise, 
Thatcher's strong emphasis on the Victorian age, right along with liberal 
economic policies, is similar with Reagen's. Neo-conservative and neo-liberal 
movements both in the US and the UK affected these behaviors of Reagen 
and Thatcher. Ozal's public stance on traditional morality had been notably 
more muted than that of his American and England counterpart.
2. 1.2. Post-Ozal Era
After Ozal was elected as the President, struggle between four incli­
nations within the MP risingly continued to gain power. At the end. Yıldırım
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Akbulut, one of the leaders of the consei'vative slant, was appointed as Prime 
Minister by President Ozal, and then was elected as the Chairman of the MP. 
Although Ozal was not able to, as President, officially have ties with the MP, 
during the period of Prime Minister Akbulut, he indirectly interfered in the 
decisions and policies of the MP government and directed the internal power 
relations within the MP. In spite of relative hegemony of nationalists and 
conservatives over others, the MP under the leadership of Akbulut who was in 
power for two years, 1989-1991, did not represent substantially any different 
features from Ozal period in terms of implementing economic and political 
policies, and of basic ideology or outlooks. During the term of Akbulut, 
discussions about the issue of a new image for the MP and the search for a 
new identity were increasingly maintained in order to able to grasp the spirit 
of 1983. This search for a new image in the post-Ozal period may find its 
clear expression in terms of the struggle among the conservative-nationalist 
side and liberal-centrist one.
In June 1991, Mesut Yılmaz, labeled as a leader of liberals and cen­
trists, was elected as the chairman of the MP and Prime Minister, replacing 
Akbulut. To begin with. Yılmaz dismissed most of staff of the government 
and the administrators of Akbulut's time and set up his new cadre in the MP 
administration and government. In this way he attempted to break the indirect 
control of Ozal over the party. The purpose of this attitude of Yılmaz was to 
dominate and direct the party by removing old cadre with his new men, and 
so the MP became the party of Yılmaz.-® Because of exclusion of some 
groups from the party, the MP was not the same with the MP under the 
leadership of Ozal which depended on the coalition of four inclinations.
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What is the new within the chairmanship of Yılmaz in the MP is that 
the MP enters into e search in order to rely on a kind of intellectual base 
because the center-rightist political parties have suffered the lack of ideo­
logical and intellectual support from the beginning. In this search of a new 
ideological identity, in these days, there is a significant tendency for accepting 
liberalism as a basic philosophy.-· Furthermore, neo-conservatism, firstly 
used by Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagen in the United States, is 
another important concept, which was clearly seen in the policies of Ozal's 
governments, in defining new ideological identity. After 1983, both 
liberalism, especially in economic sense, and conservatism started to be used 
for the first time in Turkish political life by the MP.-- Yet, unlike Ozal, 
Yılmaz attempts to effectively use both concepts as a kind of intellectual- 
ideological base. Mesut Yılmaz defines the MP's position in Turkish politics 
from 1983 until now in the following way:
A iter / 9S3, Turkey entered into a process o f transformation 
through implementing new policies and carried out new reforms by the 
MP. In the late 1980s, Turkey however faced with a sort o f  fatigue o f  
the reforms: high rate o f  inflation and foreign debt. We are now trying 
to make up a new program by which second step o f  transformation 
will be realized?·^
2. 1.3. Policies and Ideology of the MP
The MP as a center-right and moderate political party undertook to 
implement the liberal economic and democratic policies once it was in power.
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As I indicated in the previous sections, it cut across foiTner cleavages of the 
right and the left by its position as conciliatory politics and commitment to 
democracy. In this sense, one might claim that economic and political 
liberalism were two designating factors in describing the MP's policies after 
1983.
One of the high-level official in the MP, in a personal interview on 
November 10th 1993 in Ankara, noticed:
The M P has struggled with the bureaucratic and centralized  
structure o f  the state. While som e success has been gained, the 
strong state structure that com es from the era o f  the single-party  
system  could  not unfortunately be rem oved. That's why, dem ocracy  
does work with its all institutions. Still, the parliam ent and  
governm ent do not have the enough p o w e r  to control the 
bureaucracy.
The challenge of the MP to the bureaucratic and corporatist state struc­
ture through applying the liberal policies paved the way for causing such bu­
reaucratic structure to decline in quality. One of the student of Turkish 
politics mentioned that "during the 1980s, the erosion of Atatiirkism as the 
official ideology could be seen a development that provided far greater scope 
or politics. The political will rather than the bureaucratic now had the upper 
hand, particularly in those areas that were not preserved as the sphere of the 
state".However, in spite of the MP's challenge to bureaucratic structure and 
the relative liberalization of the state, this does not mean that the MP fully
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reduces the Atatiirkist principles, seen as necessary for reaching democratic 
and modern Turkey by the MP leaders.
One of the most important contribution of the MP to Turkish politics 
is to precede individual rather than the state by reducing huge burden of 
bureaucracy on the citizens; during its government, the term individual gained 
importance, and its priority the state was wholly acceded by Turkish
intellectuals. Therefore, individual seems to be regarded at the first attempt in 
all activities of government and opposition.Other contribution of the MP is 
that it brought about cau.se that Turkish intellectuals began to see economy as 
a sphere of technical field rather than a sphere of political economy whereas it 
unnecessarily insisted on and prorrounced the economy far too much, which 
led to the emergence of destructive effect in the moral structure of the society, 
with little attention to political liberalism.
The MP's view on the state is directly related with liberalism in the 
economic and political sense. It requires a small state which is only re­
sponsible for the defense, social security and infrastructure, not a state which 
controls and interferes into political life and economics. However, this small 
state should be active, which means that when it makes its original function, it 
becomes more strong.-^’ For the MP, the Turkish state is able to designate and 
impose its official ideology, represented by Atatiirkism, which is main criteria 
in shaping Turkish politics and society. It may be here mentioned that there 
exists a dichotomy among its views on the state and its liberal philosophy.^^
The MP principally depends on three freedoms shaping its under­
standing of democracy; (1) freedom of thought, (2) freedom of conscience
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and religion, and (3) freedom of enterprise. According to Yılmaz, this system 
of three freedoms in which there is no place of estatist thought and policy will 
made its mark on the political, social and economic life in the late 20th and 
21th century. The creative power of individuals takes place of the estatism 
and this system of three freedoms provides a democratic environment where 
each groups and individuals realize their projects reflecting their interest. In 
fact, the leader of the MP, in spite of these views, talks about some limitation 
on democracy not seen as a basically necessaiy and prior thing in every case. 
For instance, the MP chairman Yılmaz does not see democratic policies as a 
solution of the South Eastern question at the first hand. Indeed, in spite of the 
tendency accepting liberalism as a general ideology, the requirements of 
political liberalism may not be reflected on the MP's views, especially its 
view on the position of the state and society. It does not have a clear cut 
ideology and views resting on liberal or conservative aspects. During the 
1980s, the MP with its emphasis on economic rationality, service delivery and 
decreasing bureaucracy seemed to open up a place for itself at the center right 
of Turkish politics.
2. 2. The True Path Party 
2. 2. 1. The TPP in Opposition
The True Path Party (TPP), Doğru Yo! Partisi, basically a direct con­
tinuation of the .lustice Party, was founded in 1983 by a group of people ori­
ented by SCileyman Demirel, former leader of the .IP. Ahmet Nusret Tuna be­
came its first chairman and later, in stead of him. Yıldırım Avcı became its
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chairman. The TPP was essentially led by Demirel who was elected the chair­
man of the party in 1987. Its basic characteristics have been the articulation of 
its exclusive association with the JP and carries out the claims of inheritance 
from the Democrat Party of the 1950s.
The leader in the TPP has been very crucial because it is a party pri­
marily identified with its leader, Demirel . It is clearly claimed that it is 
Demirel's party. Following the military coups, the .lustice Party with all pre- 
1980 political parties was closed down, and so Demirel and his followers 
were banned from political activity, because of the reason that the military 
held Demirel and other pre-1980 political leaders morally responsible for the 
civil-war like situation of the 1970s. Once the military decided to turn to a 
multi-party politics, Demirel and his followers set up the Grand Turkey Party 
(GTP), Büyük Türkiye Partisi, despite the fact that he was banned from 
political activity before the 1983 elections. Yet, the military abolished the 
GTP and sent Demirel and some of his followers to the Zincirbozan military 
facilities in Çanakkale. Other followers of him, directed by Demirel to set up 
a political party through remote control from the activity, established "The 
TPP which was soon to become the symbol of democracy, liberty and 
freedom and basic rights".-**After he returned to Ankara, he continuously 
steered the TPP through his faithful followers like Yıldırım Avcı, Gökberk 
Ergenekon, Mehmet Dülger, Hüsamettin Cindoruk, ete.
The TPP had received clear and strong opposition from the military. 
Beside that, much of DP-.IP voters that made up Demirel's traditional support 
base was also captured by Turgut Ozal's MP. Feride Acar has noted:
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D espite nil negative situations, Demire! m anaged to stay in the 
politics. A fter Septem ber İ980, he fo llow ed  a deliberate strategy o f  
keeping his contacts, ve iy  close and even daily, alive supporters 
a ll over Turkey. His personality and leadership style, and the 
predom inantly patron-cUent type o f  relationship between the TPP 
and the party's supporters facilitated such a personal touch 
possible.-'^
In such successful contacts, Demirel's image of "people's man" (halk 
adamı) had a fundamental place. He has also been the only leader of major 
political party in Turkish political life who speaks with a rural. Central Ana­
tolian accent. From the beginning, he has always had a kind of a message that 
provided a commitment to the masses in a best possible way about presence 
of the true representatives of people in parliament.
The image of Demirel as the people's man, his commitment to distribu­
tive governmental policies and his personal style of easy access caused the 
clientilistic JP of the 1960s and 70s. On the contrary, with the changing 
conditions, in the 1980s, this clientilistic policies became unfavorable because 
of opposition status. Indeed, Demirel's life and personal style were not 
appropriate for the conditions in the late 1980s. The populist policies have not 
accorded well in the 1980s with a different ambitions and values of second 
and third generation urbanites, young technocrats, professional elites, 
particularly in the presence of an. alternative rightist discourse, i. e. that of the 
MP.-^ ” Thus, Demirel needed to change his general old image and also the 
image of the TPP. His new image seemed to be identical with democracy, 
struguling against the anti-democratic policies and the military. On the other
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hand, the fragments of old patronage and clientilistic relations are still main 
determining factors in the TPP's policies and organisation.
With a national referendum in September 1987, the bans against all 
former political leaders of the pre-1980 era was lifted. After that, Demirel was 
elected as the fourth chairman of the TPP at an extra-ordinaiy convention. At 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, Demirel was forced to make a "face lift" in the 
party.in order to attract the electorates. It is by this criterion, at the TPP's con­
vention in 1991, the TPP recruited "new faces" and was now striving to gain 
its aims with the help of the modern outlook. By this time. Professor Tansu 
Çiller joined the TPP. New executives of the party including Çiller were 
elected to rejiivenate the TPP. In October 1991 elections, the TPP won the 
highest number of Votes in the parliamentary elections but failed to obtain an 
outright majority, resulting the coalition set by Demirel with Erdal Inönü's 
Social Democratic Populist Party.
In its election platform, the TPP had set clear targets such as ousting 
President Ozal, introducing sweeping democratic reforms, improving Tur­
key's human rights image, reducing inflation in a reasonable period of time 
and combating terrorism within the guidelines of democratic norms. The most 
of these targets remained intact under the coalition protocol.
What are the TPP's ideology and views during opposition? The main 
ideology of the TPP depended upon three basic aspects: democracy, na­
tionalism and conservatism, which are particularly important in defining its 
identity and describing its location in the post-1980 political spectrum. Beside 
the .IP's ideas, stands and terminology, the TPP developed a new and distinct 
discourse, but it suffered the lack of sophistication in its ideological discourse.
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because of insufficient intellectual and media support and the party's existing 
intellectual cadre tending to be over shadowed by Demirel.32 Such position of 
the TPP directly relates with traditional weakness of Turkish center-right 
political parties being deprived of an intellectual basis and academic support.
The conception of "democracy", for the TPP, means unquestionable 
superiority and unhindered exercise of the "national will" (milli irade). More­
over, the ideology of the TPP bases upon the assumption that the 
"bureaucratic will" is particularly against the "national will". As a result of 
such view, during opposition, it had a dichotomy among civil and military 
bureaucracy, and ordinary people of Turkey. Such perception might be ex­
plained with the traditional center-peripheiy rift in Turkish politics. Acar sees 
the TPP's position in the following way:
It is hardly tolerant other po litica l groups and parties o f  their 
claim s to represent c iv il societal elements. Thus, i t  perceives "free 
dem ocracy" both as sim ple majoritarianism relying exclusively on the 
forces o f  periphery which are assum ed to be the incantation o f  the 
national will and as com ing to the fore only when the DP, the JP, or  
the TPP true representatives o f  the masses, are in governm ents^
This sort of perception of democracy naturally has negative implica­
tions in terms of the minority rights, legitimacy of opposition, peaceful 
transfer of power and desirability of a governmental system characterized by 
checks and balances. It is by this criterion, equating the TPP's conception of 
democracy with a pluralistic understanding of democracy appears 
problematic. Such TPP's understanding of populist and majoritarian con­
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ception of democracy is similar with the DP's perception in the 1950s. One 
may therefore argue that Turkish democracy represented populist character­
istics, especially in the 1950s, and the 1960s and 70s. This means that there 
was a strong orientation to unmediated mass political participation but not 
democracy in terms of rights of the minorities, toleration for opposition, and 
so on. To a large extent. The center-right of Turkish politics - the DP, the JP, 
the MP, and the TPP - has represented features of such understanding of 
democracy.
The theme of "democracy" and "national will", which has constituted 
the public face of the party's ideology, let the TPP displaying strong anti­
militarism. Its leadership had put a significant fight against post-coup at­
tempts to depoliticize society, and also this had maintained the basis of the 
TPP's major challenge to the MP and its leader Ozal.
The TPP's challenge to the bureaucratic will does not have the same 
meaning with which the TPP especially opposes the basic aspects of the of­
ficial ideology basing on the secularism-laicisim- and Atatiirkist principles. In 
the views of the TPP, both secularism and Atatiirkist principles that are the 
basis of the democratic and unitary state structure, and freedom of religious 
belief and freedom of thought and freedom of speech can not be restricted.34 
It is concluded that the TPP's understanding of the state and democracy has 
bounded to central official ideology, AtatCirkism.
Another meaningful ideological theme of the TPP is Turkish national­
ism defined as social cohesiveness, territorial integrity, altruism and pro­
motion of a higher national consciousness among the citizens. Its nationalism
is devoid of extreme rightist formulation of the concept: anti-communist and 
anti-leftist. In this sense, its views on the nationalism is separated from other 
major center-right party, the MP, which legalized the extremist tendency in 
Turkey by removing the code of 141, 142 and 163 in the Constitution.
Conservatism that has been perceived as the protection of national 
tradition and culture is one of the basic aspects of the TPP's ideology. Its 
perception of conservatism included a sensitivity to Muslim values and 
practices of the population; it was different from the connotative meaning of 
conservatism, as in the National Salvation Party and the Welfare Party. The 
TPP's version was basically secular.^ -*' Sometimes the leaders of the TPP used 
religious·conservatism rather than secular conservatism as a kind of rhetoric. 
In fact, the TPP strictly oppose any sort of religious political parties which 
run counter the secular ideology of the state.3^ ’
The TPP was not able to free from the views of mixed economy 
whereas, at the early 1990s, it seemed to accept liberal economic policies as 
its basic economic targets. In its party program and government protocol, it is 
claimed that, instead of setting prices by monopolistic and administrative 
decisions, flexible pricing will be adopted· with a view to invigorating the 
market. It is for this reason that the role of the state was reformulated by the 
TPP in a way that the role of the state should be to co-ordinate and stabilize 
the economy rather than rigid planning and setting inflexible goals while 
creating an environment which will stimulate the potential of the private 
sector. Privatization is a basic tenet of this policy. For the TPP, it is a means 
of consolidating the financial structure of the State Economic Enterprises 
(SEEs). The TPP's leaders defended smaller state's hegemony in the econ­
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omy, and so they require the privatization of the SEEs. These economic 
policies are same with the new right policies in the west. Patron-client rela­
tionship among the leaders and their men or followers might, however, pre­
vent to manifest indefinite attitude on the privatization issue. These economic 
policies of the TPP resulted that the challenge that came from the TPP in 
opposition was not on issues concerning economic policy because "January 
24th, 1980 Economic Measures" adopted by a government under Demirel 
formed the basis of Ozal's economic policies, and also formed the TPP's 
views on economic issue.
In short, in the post-1980 period, the TPP played a far more significant 
role in the legitimating of civilian politics and in maintaining the issue of de­
mocracy on the political agenda through the symbolism of the continuity of its 
leadership and its anti-militarism. The nature of its rather simplistic 
conception of democracy leads to a kind of fairly negative role in the devel­
opment and consolidation of pluralist democracy in Turkey.
2. 2. 2. The TPP in Government
After setting up the coalition among the TPP and the SDPP, this gov­
ernment tried to realize its targets which included the reducing high rate of 
inflation, introducing democratic reforms, etc. However, it failed in reaching 
the most of its targets, so the masses that expected too much from the TPP 
and the coalition started losing confidence in government and the TPP. 
Although the leaders of the TPP made several promises during opposition, 
they failed to keep any of them. The TPP, which insisted so much on de­
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mocracy among 1983 and 1991, started turning into a party of the status quo 
and started to abandon the superior values and norms it had striven for in the 
past decade.37 There were also accusations that a party which suffered so 
much intimidation in the hands of a military administration had forgotten the 
past and was attempting to facilitate the military.
Its challenge to the "bureaucratic will" of the state and its wish of civil 
politics which were stressed during in opposition have not been put into prac­
tice. Unlike its challenge to the MP, in terms of the relationship with the 
military and bureaucracy, there has not yet existed any different policies of 
the TPP from the MP. As we know, the TPP's anti-militaristic view had 
constituted the basis of the TPP's main challenge to the MP.
The TPP, like the DP and the .IP, has primarily based on the clientil- 
istic relations and on the party patronage. This understanding of democracy as 
a system of bargaining was, or course, less convenient in opposition than in 
government. This sort of relationship has therefore became dominant in the 
TPP in government.
When Ozal died in April 1993, the deputies decided to elect Demirel as 
President that meant the end of the active party politics for Demirel. Once 
Demirel became the President, Tansu Çiller who was former minister of the 
state in the TPP-SDPP coalition government was elected as chairperson in 
.lune 1993. First of all. Çiller attempted to eliminate the most of the pro- 
Demi rel elements in the party executive and failed. This created a new 
friction in the TPP. She also managed to weed out all the pro-Demirel men in 
the Cabinet and in the most state officers. Demirel is not the father of the
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party anymore but it became the party of Tansu Çiller, like Mesut Yilmaz.^^ 
With the last Convention of the TPP, Çiller got her leadership accepted by 
members of the TPP. In this way, the tradition of the leader-based party and 
politics in the center-right, which has been major factor in seeing leader as 
identical with party, is maintained by the examples of Çiller and Yılmaz.
Çiller relies on her ambitious privatization program in her economic 
policies and solving economic problems. She is fairly radical enough to take 
decision toward the greatest privatization operations in Turkish history. In this 
sense, she seems determined to follow Ozal's privatization philosophy. Fur­
thermore, Ozal's princes are making comebacks one after another to work for 
Çiller with whom they share ideas and principles of economic management.^^ 
It might be seen in a way that Çiller follows the path of Ozal, but not that of 
Demirel. In addition to that, the TPP, the "voice of the people of Anatolia", 
turned to pay attention to the people of big cities and thus attempts to compete 
against the MP to win urban center-right votes. This attempt of Çiller might 
be evaluated as a sort of aim to change the traditional image of the TPP, 
basing on the rural population.
As in goverriment, the TPP clearly began to depart from being party of 
the suffering masses and turned into the party of the opportunists. Democratic 
slogans, support for human rights and a derive for reforms were completely 
left in order to reach some short term gains.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE "NEW" DEMOCRATIC PARTY
1. The Grand Transformation Party and the "new" Democratic Party
In the present chapter I will investigate the "new" Democratic Party 
looking from within; how they perceive Turkish state, society and history, and 
how they understand the concept of democracy, economy, secularism and na­
tionalism. But later, in conclusion, you will find further elaboration on the 
"new" DP. In such a way, the views and ideology of the "new" Democratic 
Party (DP), D em okrat Parti, will be clarified. But, first of all, it is necessary to 
mention about the Grand Transformation Party (GTP), Büyük Değişim  
Partisi, closely relating the "new" DP because of its leader and of its program 
and principles.
The Grand Transformation Party was founded by a group of people, 
led by Aydın Menderes who is the son of late Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes executed by the military following 1960 coup. Aydın Menderes 
was a major person leading to the emergence of the GTP as a political party. 
The GTP was composed of people having distinct social and cultural 
background and origin. The GTP with its distinguishable program and prin­
ciples showed distinctive characteristics from other existing political parties. 
For instance, the GTP's perception of democracy, which based upon the
pluralistic-liberal sense of democracy without recognizing any restriction in 
front of the representation of each group and interest at the social and political 
level, reflects one aspect of these distinctive characteristics. Moreover, it 
proposed a new definition and reinterpretation of the state, that was called as 
a "referee-state" (hakem devlet). Within this respect, once it emerged, it was 
labeled a "unlimited democracy party".' Such perspective had not yet been 
seen in the program of any political party in the period of the Republic.
In 1993 prohibitions on former political parties were removed, and 
then most of these political parties were re-established. For instance, Türkeş' 
National Work Party (NWP), M illiyetçi Çalışma Partisi, got its previous 
name: the Nationalist Action Party, and the Republican People's Party was re­
established by a group of deputies splitting from the SDPP. Simultaneously, 
the DP dissolved in 1960 by the military coup came on the scene, led by 
Hayrettin Erkmen, on May 1993. Following the days of the re-emergence of 
the DP, the attempts to unite the GTP and the DP found ground in both 
political parties. Finally, in 16 January 1994, in the Grand Meeting of the DP, 
Aydın Menderes was elected as the chairman of the DP; later, by joining the 
GTP to the DP, Aydın Menderes and his new men controlled the party. This 
"new" DP entirely accepted the GTP's program as its new program.
Why did the GTP Join to the DP? The answer of such question may be 
found in the views of Aydın Menderes. For him, after the transition to a 
multi-party system, the DP in the 1950s played much more significant role in 
fulfilling the most potent transformation in the Republican era, by starting the 
democratization of the society and the state. For this reason, "when we 
founded the GTP, the spirit of 1946 was our reference point. We were not too
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much different from the DP of the 50s; we believe in similar values: 
democracy, free and national will, property rights, and the state for people. 
Because of these factors, we joined the DP, and our aim is now to interpret 
such basic principles with the new and changing context of Turkey and to 
maintain the transformation and democratization process started by the DP in 
1950".“ Menderes stressed that the "new" DP's views on the state, redefined 
as the "referee-state", linked with the attempts of the "old" DP to democratize 
the state structure. In order to make real great transformation by the program 
of the "new" DP in the 1990s, the "old" DP by its name forms some sort of 
ideological infrastructure. As to the leader of the "new" DP, globally and 
locally changing context and the rise of the grassroots movements indicate 
that Turkey needs much more democracy and the democracy Turkey needs 
has already been included in the program^ of the "new" DP.
2. Ideological Background of the "new" DP
In order to clearly understand the "new" DP's ideological background, 
we must look at the political development of Turkey and relationship between 
state and society from the ’ perspective of the "new" DP. In the early 
Republican period, there was the environment where there existed two 
different ways of life: people accepting western values and life style, on the 
one hand, and people living with the traditional and Islamic values, on the 
other hand. This can be best expressed in terms of the center-periphery 
cleavage, in which the center was made up by the bureaucratic state elites and 
intellectuals with their distinct culture, a different type of language and style 
of wear, and the periphery was composed of the rest of the people who did
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not belong to tills type of life style  ^The growing conflict between the center 
and the periphery occurred especially around two basic issues which were the 
religion - Islam - and Kurdish crises which are still dominant. For the "new" 
DP, such conflict resulted on a large scale from the shift of the regime 
(passing from the Empire to a nation-state) and so radical-anachronic 
nationalism. Beside both reasons, the strong-profound state, characterized 
with the single-party system in the early period of the Republic, restricted the 
participation of opposing groups and masses within power.-“^
As a result of pressures coming from below and of changing interna­
tional context, in 1945, the bureaucratic and civil elites directed by "Milli Ş ef 
decided to pass from the single-party system to a multi-party system. It is for 
this reason that, after 1950, during the government of the Democratic Party 
Turkey entered into a speedy process of socio-economic transformation. As to 
the leaders of the "new DP, the "old" DP led Turkey to face the conception of 
democracy, the welfare and freedom. Because of the discontent and hate to 
the single-party, the Republican People's Party, masses identified themselves 
with the "old" DP. Its success was not only resulted from such dissatisfaction, 
but also from its program that is given in the Second Chapter. With the 
accession of the "old" DP to power center and periphery were attempted to be 
linked up by each other. ’^ Serif Mardin SEEs the success of the "old" DP in a 
way that, after the 1950 elections, periphery identified itself with the DP 
showing a challenge to the center whose interest was represented by the 
RPP. And so, in 1960 military intervention supported by bureaucratic elites 
came and dissolved the DP."^
7.1
As to Aydın Menderes, socio-economic and political transformation 
started by the "old" DP picked up speed in the 1980s. Thus, Turkey started to 
become major and powerful country in its region and in the world. Neverthe­
less, from the beginning of the 1990s, a kind of "political decay" (siyasal 
çürüme), which could be seen in the indecision and instability in the field of 
internal politics, foreign policies, economic and social life, etc., became domi­
nant in Turkish politics.*^
The high-level officials of the "new" DP claims that Turkish society is 
still carrying the potentiality of the transformation, stimulated in the 1980s. 
This transformation requires economic and political development, or 
economic and political liberalism. Democratization of the state and the so­
ciety seems as a basic and necessary unit of such transformation. Main ob­
jective of the "new" DP led by Aydın Menderes is to complete the trans­
formation of the state and the society started by the "old" DP and accelerated 
by Ozal's MP.^ ^
stated;
Aydın Menderes, during personal interview on 27 November 1993,
From the beginning o f  the Republic, the soc ie ty  has 
contradicted with the state or bureaucratic side, as its w ill for  
change and transformation was restricted b y  politico-m ilitary elites.
For this reason, the society  desires to carry out a progress much 
m ore than them. A s a result o f  such e.xisting consciousness o f  the 
progress, the society  is gradually appearing as a discontent; that is, in 
terms o f  the political and econom ic conditions, the requirements o f  
autonom y by  the sphere o f  c iv il society  clashes with the po litica l
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inteipretntion of'tlw  bureaucratic and c iv il elites who do not accept to 
change the traditional bureaucratic structure.
Up to this point, tlie main purpose of the "new" DP emerges as to break 
the control of central bureaucratic structure over the society, more radical than 
other centre-right parties. The "old" DP, as the first political party seriously 
challenging the bureaucratic structure propped by the Kemalist principles, has 
very important place in Turkish politics. In this respect, the "new" DP is 
closely linked to the "old" DP with strong ties so it aspires to finish the 
hegemony of the state over the society and to open the way of the society, 
and, in this way, its desire for transformation can be easily realized.
It is clearly seen that ideological roots of the "new" DP base basically 
on the "old" DP. At the same time, other right-wing parties - the .IP, the MP 
and the TPP - have strong ties with "old" DP. Aydın Menderes, leader of the 
"new" DP, had intimate relationship with the .IP and Demirel before and after 
1980; in the period between 1970-80, he was the deputy of the .IP and in a 
remained high position in the .IP. After 1980, Aydın Menderes and Demirel 
acted together for removing the political prohibition. Following removal of 
prohibition, Demirel became the leader of the TPP whereas Menderes 
declared to leave the politics. He stressed that the reason of leaving the 
politics is the need for observing the events happening in Turkey and in the 
world from outside of active politics. Demirel, during this time, criticized the 
shadow of the military over democracy, and so, for Menderes, people 
expected from him to end up the domination of the military and bureaucracy 
over the society and democracy, but this expectation was not realized.
i>
Menderes mentions that the JP and the TPP, under the leadership of 
Demirel, did not contribute anything to the "old" DP's cause. However, he 
evaluates Ozal's era differently in which socio-economic and political trans­
formation initiated by the "old" DP was tried to be risingly kept on. Ozal tried 
to democratize Turkey, for instance, by removing the 141, 142 and 163 
articles of the constitution which were the barriers for freedom of thought and 
organisation, and he firstly opened some significant issues to public 
discussion, such as Kurdish question." Menderes criticizes everyone who 
assert to be continuation of the DP because they did nothing for democrati­
zation and economic transformation of Turkey, initiated by the "old" DP. In 
an interview made by author of the present study with Menderes, he said that 
"today, we are much closer by the national will in the path of democratization 
emerged in 1946 than the MP and the TPP era. Because they can not defend 
full democratization of the society, they are prohibitive. It is not important for 
a party to be continuation of the "old" DP, but having in relation with the 
"old" DP is important. In Turkey democratization started in 1946, but it has 
not yet come to its last halt. For him, other centre-right and -left parties say 
that we stay in the present level of democratization. This is the evidence of 
which the single party tradition is being kept on these political parties. 
Nevertheless, Turkey needs much more democratization ever before. The 
1946's spirit is the expression of the "national will" and the wish of people. 
Some of the objectives of the "old" DP have been done until now, and we will 
finish the rest of them". These words of Aydın Menderes clearly displays the 
ideological roots and targets of the "new" DP.
Aydın Menderes rejects the concepts of the right and the left for the 
definition of his position and the classifying his party. Recently, the concepts
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of right and left lost their importance in determining the position of political 
parties in Turkey and in the world. He claims, in an interview with Menderes 
made by author, that they can not fit into a political context arranged 
according to the separation of the right and the left but they are attempting to 
squeeze in this type of political fan into their body for a new Turkey. "Both 
concepts are not the products of our society so they do not manifest our 
political structure. It is not clear that what concept of right and left mean in 
Turkey. Also, it is not useful to describe Turkish political structure by these 
concepts. They may give some general approximation, but can not reflect 
Turkish political life. One party may have some characteristics of rightist or 
leftist party at the same time".'-
Two types of political party or political movement, Menderes claims, 
are starting to be dominant in Turkish politics: "tutucu" (conservative) party 
and "yenilikçi" (renovative) party. They will take the place of the term right 
and left. He sees his party, the "new" DP, as a kind of "yenilikçi" party 
aiming to transform the society with the help of its democratization pro­
gram. 13
What policies should be followed by the "new" DP to realize this trans­
formation? For the "new" DP, in the sense of the transformation of the society 
and the state there are two political movements; first one is "değiştiriciler" 
who try to primarily apply or keep on an abstract model on society. In the 
Turkish case, from the Tanzimat era up to now, the efforts of transformation 
have been made or directed from up to down. One of the high officials of the 
"new" DP indicates that such transformation of the society is closely 
associated the rule from above. The second is "değişimciler" who defend the
77
necessity of spontaneous transformation and try to take away the obstacles, 
which hinder the social transformation, in front of the society, but they do not 
offer an abstract model. Menderes put his party, the "new" DP, in the second 
group. In such a way, implicitly, the "new" DP challenges to the official 
ideology of the state, Atatürkism, which have tried to transform the society 
from above.
This sort of understanding and perception shape the reasons of the for­
mation of a new political party - the GTP - and a new party program. This 
new party with its program and its cadre joined by the "new" DP under 
Menderes leadership. The leader of the "new" DP criticizes, in Turkey, thirty 
or forty people come together and easily form’a political party, and , at that 
moment, program and views of party are determined. Such formation of a 
political party emerges as the personal preferences rather than the social 
preference. He indicates that, for forming a new party and program, some 
views should be discussed, and then, people who agree with these views form 
a community before setting up a political party. They tried to pass into this 
process and gave shape to a new political cadre who constitutes the nucleus of 
the GTP and, now, of the "new" DP.
Until here, one can not fairly separate the party - the "new" DP - and 
its leader - Aydın Menderes - from each other. Although Menderes criticizes 
other party formation, personalistic aspects appears to be one of the 
significant determinant factor in the emergence of the "new" DP within its 
new program. The name of Menderes could not be taken separately from the 
"new" DP. However, he says, "I do not think politics myself in personalistic 
basis. If being the leader of the "new" DP leads to be source of authority for
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me over the party, I am going to prevent such tendency. I never force the 
party for anything not wished. Our party will exist as "fikir platformu" (a 
platform of idea). In this respect, we purpose to form a kind of party, its 
members can easily oppose a draft of proposed law about tax submitted by the 
"new" DP when it is in power".
In sum, the "new" DP's attitudes toward Turkish political and social 
life places it in a different position from other centre-right parties, but the 
"new" DP and the centre-right parties, especially the MP and the TPP, 
ideologically have some similar features in terms of sharing the heritage of 
the "old" DP. It is obviously seen that Adnan Menderes and Turgut Ozal are 
two major leaders who substantially influence Aydın Menderes' views and 
the path of the "new" DP.
3. The Reasons of the Necessity for a New Program
There are several reasons which led Menderes and his new cadre to 
provide a new program. Firstly, for them, changing socio-political and socio­
economic context of the world and of Turkey seems a basic reason that re­
quired a new program in order to catch the direction of change and to steer it 
into a useful manner. Menderes summarizes the reason for why a new 
program is needed in the following way; "The governments have changed, the 
prime ministers have changed but the misfortune of the nation has not 
changed. The reason of the existence of the "new" DP with its’program is to 
change the misfortune of T u r k e y " Wh a t  is the meaning of the term 
"misfortune of the nation"'.  ^At the first hand, it comprises the practical social
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and economic problems, such as inflation, terrorism, bribe, unemployment, 
foreign dept, and so on. Other is too general, that is the problems aroused 
from ideological and cultural differences among governor and governed, or 
among political and bureaucratic elites and masses.
As it was indicated in the first part, according to the "new" DP, in the 
early 1990s Turkish politics faced with a kind of "political conuption", il­
lustrated as inability of the government for solving economic and social 
problems and for providing new reforms. There has been existing dynamics of 
transformation and progress in the society, and been requirements of people 
resulting from such directions. This paved the way for the conflict among 
elites or governors, who want to be identical with the bureaucratic tradition, 
and the dynamic social forces. That is, the desire of the autonomy by the 
sphere of civil society has clashed with the political interpretation represented 
by the state and politico-military elites. As to Menderes, this duality has 
existed as a different type in respect of the conditions of each period, and the 
"new" DP with its program is a retranslating of such duality in the sphere of 
politics. Minimising the negative effects of such dichotomy is a fundamental 
"mission" of the "new" DP.·'’
Because of these reasons, for Menderes, the party needed a new pro­
gram. Forming a new program with a new party should be different from 
other existing political parties. For him, as different from other political 
parties, his political movement is rising from down to up by extending the 
political discussions over large segments of society. Thereby, the "new" DP 
will be successful to provide a social consensus and a reconciliation among 
governor and governed.'^
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The "new" DP is composed of various groups and people having dis­
tinctive origins and opinions but, at a certain level, they come to a consensus 
on some chief principles which are democratic values and demands of trans­
formations of the society. It aims therefore to be a "melting-pot".
Why do they need a "new" party, small party, in stead of realizing their 
aims in one of the big party of the centre-right? Menderes, in an inteiwiew 
made by the author of this study with him in November 1993, stressed that 
"we have a sort of program, and in order to implement such a program, a new 
party and a new cadre are a must. In this way, this party would be registered 
as an owner of the views in the program that is accepted as a mission of the 
party. It is for the reason that there is no suitable condition in other parties to 
implement their program, and so they joined to the "new" DP to give a 
ingenious message and to become a united whole with its program. It is 
rumoured that, when the election for the chairman of the MP was made in 
1991, Ozal offered Menderes to become the chairman of the MP, but he did 
not accept it because he could not realized his targets in the MP.
4. The Program of the "new" DP
In 1946, Turkey entered into the process of democratization, but, until 
now, it has not achieved a stable development. This is because of three 
military interventions which interrupted such process and of the bureaucratic 
and military elites who produced tensions in the political system and 
remained dysfunctional for the development of democracy. One can thus 
claim that Turkey has not yet had all of the democratic institutions and
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structures. For the "new" DP, after 1946 tlie ilrst stage of democratization 
began in Turkey, and by new changes all over the world in 1989, the second 
stage of democratization started to widespread, which has effectively felt in 
Turkey. In order to complete the process of democratization and to grasp the 
level of pluralist-liberal democracy, at this second stage, both democratization 
and economic transformation of. Turkey are unavoidable and inevitable 
aspects.
4. 1. Democratization
In this part the question of how the "new" DP sees the concept of de­
mocracy and the process of democratization are .going to be answered. The 
"new" DP evaluates democracy as a phenomenon which ought to be applied 
in all spheres of life, and at the level of the state, of economy, of education, of 
military, of mass-media, etc. Due to this reason, democracy is not only a thing 
which is remembered at the elections time and it does not only mean giving 
vote. Democratization requires two fundamental features. First one is that 
each individual has a right to choose his/her life style and to belong to an 
identity and to develop his/her cultural values or norms in an unrestricted 
fashion. Thus, it is necessary for democracy that each group, ideology and 
individual can freely express their views and , if they wish, can set up their 
association or their political parties in order to defend their interest in the 
social and political arena legally. The state or any other institution can not 
designate their ways of life, in place of individual or group. State is, however, 
only responsible for protecting democracy and providing the security of the 
citizens and creating a democratic environment with the quarantine of 
freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish
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their opinions. According to the program of the "new" DP, available cultural 
and traditional differences acquired by several social units in Turkey are 
national richness so they should be accepted in terms of a free and pluralistic 
context without any social and legal restriction. Here, it can be claimed that 
the "new" DP requires a kind of cultural and political pluralism which 
necessitates that other ways of life would allow in a pluralist society. In 
Turkey, for example, religious or ethnic oriented political party can be freely
set up. IS
Second important characteristic of the "new" DP's program is that the 
position of the state should be redefined in such a way that it should not be an 
instrument of imposing views, ideology or belief on people. It should act as 
umpire or referee in order to arbitrate on the complex demands of heterogene­
ous society. That is. it should be a "referee-state" (hakem devlet), being a 
referee among different groups or ideologies. And so, such sort of the state 
can not hinder socio-economic and socio-political transformation, formed by 
the society itself, towards more pluralistic society.·'' Responsibility of such 
state is restricted only with providing the security of individuals and groups, 
and removing external factors which threaten their private life, and also, 
according to need, the state should be responsible for providing some services 
in a limited manner, but it should not interfere in their private life.
To realize the process of democratization, for Menderes, depends upon 
the desire of society. A political party is, however, needed to turn this desire 
of society into a "political consciousness". The "new" DP attempts to perform 
this responsibility; that is why, its principal objective is to transform the
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political consciousness into a " national will". At the last instance, the society 
will make a decision about its situation and determine how it evolves.-O
Another significant factor relating with the position of the "new" DP is 
that democracy within the party itself is the first step in the fulfilment of the 
democratization process. It is by this criteria, the "new" DP aims to become a 
"fikir platformu" ( a platform of ideas). Menderes mentions that they do not 
look for the unity of belief in their party. For this reason, the "new" DP is a 
party which depends on the consensus on some concrete targets. It is the re­
flection of this assertion that the "new" DP is composed of people who do not 
have the same world view and one's general philosophy of life. He, also, 
claims that they intended to create a political party in which members are able 
to criticize each other and, if it is necessary, one of them can freely give a 
vote against draft of a proposed law by the "new" DP in the parliament, but 
not a political party which is purely linked with its leaders. Simply, they try to 
be a "mass party" in that everything is freely discussed and each social unit 
participates or is represented. Menderes says that, in today's context of 
Turkey, there is no real mass party. In Turkish political parties which are 
called "mass parties", masses are not represented. Indeed, there are some 
groups in these parties, but, for instance, there is no one worker deputy in the 
par l iament . In the words of Menderes,
In the politics, the hegem ony o f  the status and the m oney  
sh ou ld  he ended. Unfortunately, both, which are especially seen in the 
parties ca lled  as the m ass party, have dom inated Turkish p o litica l 
life. I f  we want the hegem ony o f  dem ocratic institutions and structures
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in 111 I splits re o f hie, there needs a po litica l party  which does not depend  
on the dom ination o f  the status and the m oney.--
The predominately patron-client type of relationship between political 
parties and their supporters is thus regarded as a chief obstacle in front of 
Turkish democratization process. For the "new" DP, because of the patron- 
client relations, it is necessarily needed to develop the internal democracy 
within political parties. In the centre-right tradition, such a party patronage 
and clientelistic relationship have been dominantly resulted from their 
pragmatism and strong grassroots organisation.
For the "new" DP, following three basic aspects is a must in the 
process of democratization, in respect of the "new" DP; (1) everyone has a 
free life as s/he wishes, (2) no one can distLirb other, and (3) everything can 
be discussed publicly. Under such circumstances, as to Menderes, human 
beings can easily reach truth and consensus through discussion and dialogue. 
Democratization also seems inevitable in order to join different groups and to 
minimize the existing tension among them by creating a system of contracts 
and consensus. -^"*
In the views of the "new" DP, localization - strengthening the local 
governments - or decentralization, which means the transfer of planning, 
decision making, or administrative authority from central government to local 
governmental organisation is regarded as a major step in the process of 
democratization. Power should be diffused across a wide range of local in­
stitutions and organizations as well as national one. The rising participation 
and representation of people within local governmental organi.sation in the
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program of the "new" DP is aimed. Hence, the assembly of municipalities or 
local administration will be composed of the citizens elected from each 
"mahalle" (quarter) by its dwellers.
In addition to these, the "new" DP's perception of democracy is 
strongly connected with occupational groups and associations which are one 
of civil societal elements. To this effect, Menderes asks why there is only one 
body of lawyers, or why there is only one society for architects. These legally 
restricted and centrally determined association prevent democratization of the 
society by creating a political and social monopoly. For him, these are the 
corporatist habits coming from the single-party era. In the government of the 
"new" DP, as to its leader, the political prohibition over the managers of 
unions, occupational groups, professors, and those like that, will be 
a b o lish e d .Menderes says,
IVd w in  be staunch supporters o f  a dem ocracy in which 
everyone w ill have the right to express and publish his/her opinions 
and freedom  o f  assem bly and association. We want a dem ocracy for  
a "demokrat Türkiye" where everyone, without any restriction, is  
free.-^
Democracy, for the "new" DP, which quarantines the system of con­
tracts, is tightly linked with a consensus among different segments of the 
society, and so insisting democracy from above is inappropriate for the 
nature of democracy. The limits of freedom as proposed by the "new" DP do 
not allow individuals to violate common rights of each other and are de­
termined by their common values.
4 . 2 . E c o n o m ic  T ra n sfo rm a tio n
The second fundamental item in the program of the "new" GTP which 
is economic transformation directly relates with the principles of economic 
liberalism. To strengthen the private sector, to provide suitable condition 
where free market is fully settled down, and to remove the state intervention 
over the market and economy appear as the principal characteristics of the 
"new" DP's economic goals. In these days, the economic liberalism, or free 
market economy, is unique case approximately accepted by all nations in the 
world. While some specific differences exist, in Turkey, the policies of the 
liberalisation of economy are existed in the program of each political party·
What are the views of the "new" DP on the economic liberalism? The 
role of the state, which is very important in terms of designating the direction 
of economy, is minimized in a liberal economy. Menderes evaluates the role 
of Turkish state in the way that the proportion of the state in the Gross 
National Product and in the budget is increasing, on the one hand; public 
investment is decreasing, on the other hand. Such huge proportion of the state 
in the GNP has hindered the political and economic liberalism. He argues that 
the existence of democratization is impossible with a state that owns the half 
of the National Profit and continuously interferes to the market and economy. 
Under such case, economic liberalism itself can not bring democratization and 
liberal democracy, or v/ce-vema. Economic liberalism and democratization, 
for Menderes, should come together. It is because that the state and the 
bureaucracy are able to significantly influence and steer political and 
economic decisions, if they take in the charge of the economy. Because of 
this, privatization that seems to be one of the most fundamental ways for
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making the state smaller emerges as a main part of the process of 
democratization.
The "new" DP's view on the privatization of the State Economic Enter­
prises (SEEs) is internally linked with its understanding of democratization 
which may be realized throughout the relationships among distinct societal 
and political units. It risingly gains importance for breaking the hegemony of 
the state over society and economy. How is the privatization of the SEEs 
realized, in the program of the "new" DP? There are two types of the SEEs in 
Turkey: first type which is profitable, and second one, which loses money. 
First of all, the SEEs having positive cost will be sold, and then obtained 
revenues from the sale may be used to improve the condition of the SEEs 
which are not profitable. Besides, they may be used to encourage the private 
sectors ardently which are willing to buy the SEEs. As the state provides 
credits, it may lay down a condition that workers are not sent out.
To this effect, the "new" DP's principal critics to all governments, 
which have caused higher public expenditures, especially, resulting from the 
populist policies and patron-client relations, comes into the picture. Both the 
public expenditures and the SEEs are two fundamental causes of the public 
finance gap (kamu finansman açığı). The "new" DP therefore offers the 
restriction of the public expenditure which leads to increase internal dept.
The privatization of the SEEs, the restriction of the public expenditure 
and the control of the internal dept are anticipated in the program of the "new" 
DP as main principles paving the way for the decline of the public finance 
gap. Within the successful implementation of these policies, inflation may
decline. Menderes stresses that, such process takes long time; for instance, the 
decline of inflation to 10 per cent in a period of 6 or 8 years. Furthermore, a 
new reform of expenditure is inevitably needed for the improvement of the 
present situation of the economy, of the politics and of the state. As the "new" 
DP comes to power, there will be new regulations in the tax law to reach its 
goals.
The role of the state in economy should be limited only to improve 
economic conditions by assuring stability, while creating an environment that 
will stimulate the potential of the private sector. Menderes, in his opening 
speech in the Convention of the "new" DP on February 1994, said that " it 
should not be forgotten that a state which can affect one's daily fond (rizik) 
can easily influence the individual's preference and belief. It is for this 
reason that economy should be largely independent from the control of the 
state. Within the larger proportion of the economy controlled by the state, 
someone holding power can easily and deliberately the frustrate opposition 
and other social groups. Furthermore, for the "new" DP's economic program, 
finance sector will be determined as to the free market conditions without any 
intervention, which necessitates the autonomy of the Central Bank. Not like 
the centre-right and centre-left political parties, the "new" DP opposes the full 
membership to the European Community which will lead to restrict the 
regional and international preferences and benefits of Turkey. In this case, 
Turkey should pay attention to the regional economic co-operation and try to 
benefit from the competition between great economic blocks. Its views on the 
custom union with EC, which will come about in 1995, is also very different 
from other parties.
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State as a fundamental determinant factor in political life and an or­
ganized body, has been significant in all societies throughout history. Strong 
and centralized state has predominantly existed as a unique power in Turkish 
politics. The "new" DP sees such state structure as a handicap which has 
created difficulties for the process of democratization and of economic 
transformation of the society. That's why, the state ought to be reformed and 
transformed into a new type designated by the society.
In the following pages, the question of what the state defined by the 
"new" DP ought to do and what it ought not to do will be attempted to be dis­
cussed. Basic roles of the state are to get the security and happiness of the 
citizen and the society which may be called as the civil liberties of all citizens, 
to protect the independence and the national unity of the country, to regulate 
the justice service, to remove the obstacle before the social peace, to make 
some infrastructural facilities which can not be done by the private sector, and 
those like that. What is new on the position of the state is that the state should 
not be an instrument of getting any ideology, belief or view accepted by the 
society and individuals. That is, the state should not have whatsoever 
ideological identity leaned on its individuals, and also should not interfere to 
the political process and to the political requirement for the name of a 
ideological identity. This state is called as a "referee-state".-^
The "new" DP's slogan relating with this new reformulating and 
definition of the state is that "Güle Güle Yasakçı Devlet, Merhaba Hakem- 
Devlet" ( Good-bye the Prohibitor State, Hello the Referee-state). This pro-
5. T h e  "new " D P 's V ie w s  o n  th e  S ta te  an d  th e  S o c ie ty
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hibitor state is a heritage of the single-party era clarified at the outset. It is a 
chief responsibility of the state to procure an environment where the prefer­
ence of individual can freely emerge and organize. Within this respect, 
Menderes expresses that each individual can freely decide what they learn, 
what they consume and produce, what they wear, what degree they believe 
something, but not the state.-** As a result , all ideologies, views, etc., can 
express themselves unlimitedly, and, if they wish, they can found their po­
litical parties which can not be closed. But, with one exception is that they 
can be closed by the state, if they apply to use force. This sort of freedoms 
guarantied by the state may give a chance to all different sub-cultural groups 
expressing themselves; thus, they can freely speak their language, broadcast 
with their language and choose any belief without any restriction.
Reformulating of the position of the state, the "new" DP frankly 
challenges to the state based on the Atatiirkist principles, the basis of the 
official ideology of the Republic. It reflects that the "new" DP sides with the 
society in dichotomy among the state and society. In the words of Menderes,
is not n secret thing whereas i t  is  an en tity  m ade up o f  
individuals so  it  should be in the hand o fp eo p le . I f  we learn to look  
at the problem s, resulting from the d ichotom y between the state and  
the society, from the perspective  o f  people, we can easily  so lve  the 
problem s.-'’^
Why does people require such sort of state? because they, as for 
Menderes, do not want a state that is interventionist and determinist, and 
looks down on. In order to turn this desire of people into a political con-
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scioLisness, there needs a political party aiming to realize it. The "new" DP 
tries to carry this mission towards intending to transform the existing ten­
dency into a political consciousness and later into a national will.
As it is indicated at the outset of this part, principal challenge of the 
"new" DP is directed to the traditional bureaucratic structure, and bureaucratic 
and political elites who have attempted to plug the participation and represen­
tation of the people. Menderes says, "the main reason of these elites' behavior 
is the fear of loosing their sitLiation in the state and loosing of the economic 
and social p ro fit" .T h ese  views of the "new" DP about the Republican 
ideology substantially differentiate it from other centre-right parties.
In order to reformulate the role of the state, the rearrangement of the 
constitution comes the most crucial task in the "new" DP's program. A new 
constitution that gives priority to the freedom and right of individual. In the 
program of the "new" DP, the state control over the health, education and 
social security services which are not responsibilities of the social state are 
not included as social policies. The social security system will , therefore, be 
prepared in a way that a society that can procure its social security itself will 
try to be formed through supporting and encouraging civil organizations. To 
this effect, the emphasis is clearly on solidarity by mutual help organizations 
or civil associations. It is one way of freeing from the guardianship of the 
state. Moreover, the encouragement of private sectors for education and 
health services are located in its program.- '^ Besides, the role of the state in 
providing cultural acti\ ities is to sohie e.xtent restricted. Menderes stated, in a 
personal interview on .luly 1994 in Ankara, "in the government of the "new"
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DP there is not going to be the Ministry of Culture. Cultural services will be 
transferred to the civil societal elements and voluntai7 associations".
The Turkish military in the Republic era has had strong links with the 
regime and has played a much more crucial role, in various important his­
torical task, with three interventions sh.aping political and party system. 
Therefore, the "new" DP's outlook to the military automatically becomes a 
challenge to its present position. As being a soldier of the Kemalist regime, 
Turkish military in the Republican period has manifested the interventionist 
character. Thus, the first duty of Turkish military has been to suppress some 
internal political, social and cultural elements which potentially seem as a 
threat for the regime; it means that it has e,\isted as'the regime's military. 
Turkish military, as for the "new" DP, should be reorganized to get rid of 
external threats, brit not be a watchman of whatsoever ideology.
The "new" DP's understanding of the position of the state seems to be 
influenced by the liberal tendency all over the world as well as the loss of 
credibility of the welfare state. Hence, one can infer from the "new" DP's 
views on the state that the notions of the pluralist and liberal theories of the 
state appears the core-sources of its views. It is obviously seen that it sides 
with the society rather than the tradition of centralized and strong state, and 
rejects this state with its all bureaucratic structures.
6. The Views of the "new" DP on Religion and Secularism
The "new" DP's view on Islam represents so many peculiar charac­
teristics. different from those of other Turkish political parties. Islam as a
basic cultural unit has existed the historical phenomenon shaping Turkish 
culture and social structure. One can thus evaluate it as an element that has 
attached different ethnic and cultural groups. The "new" DP opposes the state 
hegemony and control over religion. Menderes notices.
The state should  not control the religion. Religion, Islam, 
ought to be ideologically  autonomous so  that the c iv il societa l 
organizations and associations which are desirous m ay perform  
religious affairs in p lace  o f  the state. On the other hand, certain 
religious services are inevitably m ade b y  public  ser\dces, i f  som e  
services can not be perform ed  b y  the c iv il societa l elements, such as 
funeral services, p rovid in g  "imam", etc. In this sense, there w ill be the 
pu b lic  religious service largely restricted.^-''
In the program of the "new" DP, there are the themes to privatize relig­
ious seiwices gradually. This privatization depends on the emphasis that mem­
bers of universities, representatives of the "Diyanet işleri" and agents of 
voUmtary associations should come together for a negotiation and attempt to 
reach certain general consensus about how religious affairs and services are 
performed, and how religious organizations are organized and which 
functions they perform. For Menderes, voluntary associations, intending to 
perform the religious services, are the components of a pluralist society; yet, 
in terms of designation their responsibilities, they have to reach an agreement. 
The leaders of the "new" DP are against the thought that there can not be civil 
reliuious associations and organizations.^·*
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Mencleres mentions that like other units in the society, Islamic ele­
ments have freedom of association and assembly in the democratic condi­
tions; that is, there may be political party advocating the religious law and 
order. Furthermore, the compulsory lectLire of religion in the primary and 
secondary education will be removed when the "new" DP is in government. 
Instead, there might be elective courses, such as Arabic, Religion, etc.3-‘'
The "new" DP's views about the secularist understanding and policies 
of the Kemalist ideology are not too much different from its perception of the 
bureaucratic structure and the official ideology of the regime. In general, in 
the conte.xt of today, the regime does not maintain its sensitivity about the 
official ideology anymore. Therefore, a sort of democratic framework in 
which secularism can be discussed and criticized, and anti-secularist views 
can freely organize as a association or political party and participate, should 
be completely fo rm e d .A s  to Menderes, in such democratic context, if an 
anti-secularist movement becomes the majority, it may make certain changes 
in secularism.-'^
7. The Views of the "new" DP on Nationalism
Another critique of the "new" DP about the official ideology is the 
Kemalist nationalism which is the one of chief principles of Atatiirkism. As to 
the "new" DP, the Kemalist nationalism has not been successful because it 
could not have obtained a needed harmony among various sub-cultural and 
ethnic groups, and so it has brought the country to face with the threshold of 
division. Because of such failure, Turkish state has to make peace by its past
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and Muslim identity. Now, Muslim identity and Kurdish identity are two fun­
damental reasons which are compelling Turkey towards this reconciliation 
with its past, its history. If Turkey wants to be a major regional power and 
obtains the internal integration, it should make peace with Islam, which is a 
name of living together in Anatolia and of imperial v is io n .T h e  origins of 
Kurdish issues are interconnected with the implementation of anachronistic 
Turkish nationalism policies, which led to many problems in Turkey having 
the imperial heritage, by the governors.
Such outlook shapes the "new" DP's nationalistic approach that is not 
based upon the racist understanding. It is essential for its approach that the 
role of Islam is very significant in attaching Anatolian people each other for a 
long time. It is clear from its approach that its ideas on nationalism find its 
fair e.xpression in the concept of "Anadolucu Milliyetçilik" (Anatolian 
Nationalism).
Spiritual and mystic views which may procure the internal integration 
of Turkey have substantial place in the views of the DP on nationalism. 
Menderes, in his speech in Eskişehir in 1993, claims that "the solution of the 
South Eastern problem lies hidden in the united and integrated thoughts of 
Yunus Emre", and he goes on, "we tiy to be like dervishes or gazhi, we will 
be in the service of our nation by the power taken from their spirituality".40 
Its approach on nationalism does not rest on pure Turkish nationalism in that 
race seems to be chief determining factor. Hence, the conception of Turkish 
identity can not be used in defining its views on nationalism, not found in the 
speech of Menderes and party program.
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8. The "new" DP and Other New Centre-Right Parties and Political
Movements
By tile early 1990s, Turkish politics was characterized by fragmenta­
tion and polarization, and lack of decisive authority on the part of the gov­
ernment and opposition. Such fragmentation and polarization are much more 
sever on the right-wing of Turkish politics faced with getting strong minor 
parties including the WP and the NAP, and the emergence of new political 
parties. The "new" DP under the leadership of Aydın Menderes, the New 
Party of Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal - the brother of Turgut Ozal - Cem Boyner's the 
New Democracy Movement, the Grand Unity Party under Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu 
and Besim Tibuk's Liberal Party, which are in the margin of the political 
system are the most important of these new political parties and movements. 
They are striving to search for forming a new approach and consensus by 
resting on the society and the civil societal elements, as opposite to being the 
status quo in the centre including the major centre-right parties: the TPP and 
the MP.
One may see the "new" DP as the candidate for establishing a "liberal 
conservative" movement; Yusuf Ozal's New Party (NP), Yeni Parti, as the 
candidate for forming a "liberal technocrat" movement; Besim Tibuk's 
Liberal Party (LP), Libera! Parti, as "liberal democrat"; the New Democracy 
Movement as "liberal democrat" movement, and Yazicioglu's Grand Unity 
Party (GUP), Büyük Birlik Partisi, as "liberal nationalist" movement.· '^ Their 
principal similarity is to defend political liberalism vis-à-vis the central 
authority of the Republic of Turkey. These political parties and movements
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usually use the terms of "yeni" (new), "değişim" (transformation or change) 
and "demokrasi" (democracy), but most of them are uncommitted the label of 
"liberal". Quite to the contrary, their importance stems from using different 
version of liberalism.
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•For this labelling, see A'oA/.?(Weekly Periodical Istanbul), 16-22 May 1993.
“Statement made by Aydm Menderes, during a personal interview, 5 July 
1994, Ankara.
^The "new" DP's program inckides two principal aspects; (1) Democratization 
in that, without any restriction, every individual has the right to express 
his/her opinion in a free condition and state ought to give up to impose any 
view or ideology forcefully, and (2) Economic transformation that relates 
with liberal economic policies. See, D em okrat Partí Program Taslağı, 
(Ankara: DP, 1994), pp. 4-5.
^On the centre-periphery cleavage, see Şerif Mardin, "Centre-Periphery Re­
lations: A Key to Turkish Politics", Daedalus. 102 (1973), pp. 169-90.
-B ü yü k  Yürüyüş {Oñ'xcxíú Bulletin of the GTP), 21 May 1993, p. 2.
’^Aydm Menderes, Ve S iyasette  Yeni Yönelişler, (Istanbul: Dergah Yay., 
1992), Pp. 246-247.
“^Şerif Mardin, 1973, p. 186.
^Büyük Yürürüş, p. 2.
^Personal interview with Aydın Menderes, 27 November 1993, Ankara.
•OAydm Menderes, Ve Siyasette Yeni y'öneiişier, pp. 164-165.
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’^Taken from the lecture of Aydın Menderes in METU, 4 November 1993, 
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1993, Ankara.
’-“^A personal interview with Aydın Menderes, 27 November 1993, Ankara.
Büyük Yürüyüş, 1 .lune 1993, p. 2.
’"^ Ibid, p. 2.
’ ^ Demokrat Parti Program Taslağı, pp. 20-21.
’^Statement made by Aydın Menderes during a personal interview, 5 June
1994, Ankara.
îOlbid.
’Ibid.
22lbid.
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5 February 1994, Ankara.
-^ A y d in  M e n d e r e s , "Y eter! S ö z  M ille tin d ir" , Genç Demokrat, n o . 2 , 1 9 9 4 .
2- I^bid.
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29lbid.
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3^Ibid, p. 2.
"Anadolucu Milliyetçilik", race odes not determine the national identity 
itself so the radical unity is not necessarily seen as a basis of Turkish nation or 
Turkish national identity. This nationalism rests upon the unity which is 
defined with the historical fatalism. Anatolian nationalism perceive the na­
tional history from the religious and spiritual perspective. It is an attempt of 
melting Islam and nationalism into same pot. Islam has played most potent 
role in terms of designating the unity of historical fatalism. For further details, 
see Siileyman Seyfi Öğün, Türkiye'de Cem aatçi M illiyetçilik  ve Nurettin  
Topçu, (İstanbul: Dergah Yay., 1992), pp. 23-27.
40A Speech delivered by Aydın Menderes in Eskişehir on May 1993.
41 For these calling, see Nilüfer Göle, "Liberal Yanılgı", Türkiye Günlüğü, 24 
(1993), pp. 12-ıs. Deniz Gürsel and C. Hakan Arslan see the New •De­
mocracy Movement identical by universalise liberalism. They assert that there 
may be traditionalist or local liberalism, and they emphasize the con­
sciousness of living in one culture, not on this culture, see Deniz Gürsel and 
C. Hakan Arslan, "Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi Bildirgesi'nin Eleştrisi ve 
Kapsayıcıbir Alternative", Türkiye Günlüğü, 23 (1993), pp. 108-110. To this 
effect, the liberalism of Aydın Menderes' "new" DP may represent such local 
or traditionalist liberalism.
"L aik lik" , Genç Demokrat, 2 (1 9 9 4 ) ,  p. 9 .
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSiON
In the present study, 1 have reviewed some main theoretical formula­
tions concerning the center-right politics and then have analyzed the devel­
opment of Turkish center-right parties by emphasizing their political and 
socio-economic views. In addition, the ideology and perspectives of the 
"new" DP has been elaborated looking at the question of what the new ten­
dencies are in the center-right of Turkish politics .
It is generally agreed that the center-right politics across the world is 
profoundly connected with liberal-pluralist democracy and its parliamentary 
institutions. And also, it is bound up with liberal and conservative values. 
Such liberal-pluralist democratic system guaranties the civil liberties of all 
individuals, political and cultural pluralism, the system of contracts and the 
principle of representation. It also requires a complex set of social institutions 
or a civil society relatively independent from the state. Before looking at both 
the modern perception of concepts of conservatism and liberalism in the cen­
ter-right politics, it is necessary to point out their classical usage and meaning. 
The conservatism implies a desire to maintain order and authority requiring 
the strong central governmental control. However, classical political and 
economic liberalism bases on a belief in a competitive individualism, a re­
duced and minimized role for the state, and a maximization of the market.
Modern usage of both concepts are not also free from the term new right. The 
new right which became very popular with Reagenism and Thatcherism is the 
entire collection of neo-conservative and neo-liberal movements. A range of 
liberal and conservative ideals, that the new right refers, includes principally a 
commitment to individual freedom and the primacy of the free market over 
the state, privatization of the public sectors, deregulation, reducing the wel­
fare state, limited role to the state, and a conservative and traditional moral- 
ism.
If we consider above mentioned characteristics as basis of the center- 
right politics, one may say that none of the Turkish center-right parties in the 
pre-1980 including the PRP, the FP, the "old" DP and the JP did not really 
manifest the features of the center-right politics observed in the western de­
mocracies. In the post-1980 the center-right parties including the MP and the 
TPP was influenced from the center-right movements emerging in the west. In 
fact they have not yet got along with the characteristics of the center-right 
politics. As we said at the outset, Turkish politics can be best understood in 
terms of center-periphery cleavage in general, drift among populists or demo­
crats and bureaucrats in particular. For a long time, the center-right of Turkish 
politics which represented the peripheral interests has successfully challenged 
the embodiment of the ruling bureaucratic elite - by the DP in the 1950s, by 
the JP in the 60s and 70s, and by the MP in the 80s - in the name of com­
mercial, agrarian, provincial and private enterprises' interests. Until the 
1980s, Turkish center-right had deeply connected by the simple majoritarian- 
ism, mixed economic policies based on populist pragmatic policies, and re­
flecting private interests, in place of pluralist notion of democracy and liberal-
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pluralist social system and liberal economic policies which are the grounds of 
the center-right politics.
In the 19S0s the MP, emerging as a democratic and relatively grass­
roots alternative, dominated Turkish politics. Unlike previous center-right 
parties, it emphasized on the liberalization of economy - defending the free 
market economy, privatization, less state intervention, economic rationality - 
and, in some ca.ses, the liberalization of politics - giving preference to indi­
vidual rather than the state, cross cutting prior ideological cleavage by procur­
ing: a coalitions of four inclinations; nationalists, conservatives, liberals and 
social democrats. Besides, during the 80s, it could be elaborated as a synthesis 
of conservative and liberal \alues. Such synthesis was also the basis of 
Reagan's and Thatcher's policies tied with the new right movement. In addi­
tion to his liberal view s and policies, one of the unique features of Ozal which 
was identical to Reagen and Thatcher was the emphasis on traditional and 
conservative moralism coming together with the liberal economic policies. By 
challenging to bureaucratic structure of the state, the MP gained a relative and 
limited liberalization of the state in economic and liberal sense. Quite to the 
contrary, after 1987 turning to the populist policies, which had been applied 
by the center-right parties resulted from their patronage and clientelistic 
relations, substantially injured its liberal economic and political policies. In 
the 1990s, it starts to come close more and more to central official ideology 
and centrist values. The MP's perception of democracy is concerned with 
three freedoms; of speech, of religion and belief, and of enterprise,which are 
the rellection of the liberal-pluralist notion of democracy, but, in reality, its 
views and policies are not completely depended upon such values. Today, in 
spite of a tendency iiccepting liberalism as a general philo.sophy and ideology
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of the party, requirements of political liberalism may not be seen in the views 
of the MP, especially on the position of the state, and the rights of sub­
cultural groups and minorities.
The TPP as a successor of the JP is another political party dominating 
Turkish center-right in the 1980s and 1990s. Once it was in opposition, the 
TPP defended the ci\ il politics resting on "democracy" and "national will" 
m -d-m 'the military and anti-democratic policies, as its counter-part, the JP. 
The TPP perceives democracy as simple majoritarianism relying exclusively 
on the forces of periphery, and unhindered exercise of the national will. Be­
cause of this, such populist and majoritarian sense of democracy shows 
harshly tolerance to other political parties and politico-social groups, and it is 
the cause of negatix e implications in terms of minority rights, legitimacy of 
opposition and peaceful transformation of power. Therefore, we can not easily 
equate the TPP's conception of "democracy" with a pluralistic-liberal un­
derstanding of the term. There is simplicity in its ideological discourse, as a 
result of receiving less support from intellectuals and media. In its program 
we find some liberal economic policies: privatization, less state, not rigid 
planning, etc. Once it came to power, the TPP was not successful to realize its 
aims, especially in getting civil politics and liberal economic policies. Like 
the "old" DP and the .IP, fragments of old party patronage and clientelistic 
relations are largely tied with the TPP. Such understanding of democracy as a 
system of bargaining seems being one of the so many reasons preventing to 
achieve its economic and democratic targets.
In the early 1990s high fragmentation and polarization, and the lack oi 
ideological certainty of the goxernment and the opposition started to dominate
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Turkish political life. Because two minor political parties - the Welfare Party 
and the Nationalist Action Party - started to gain strength, and new political 
parties and movements started to come on the scene, such fragmentation and 
polarization are seriously felt on the right-wing of Turkish politics. These 
newly emerging political parties and movements which are the consequence 
of ideological differences are seeking to search new ideology and consensus. 
In this search they attempt to rest on the civil societal elements through criti­
cizing the sterilization of the center comprising the major center-right parties 
(the MP and the TPP) and the center-left parties, and through criticizing the 
centralist stiiti/s quo. As one of these new small parties, the "new" DP, led by 
Aydın Menderes, is based upon an emphasis of liberal-pluralist democratic 
system which means that each group and individual can freely express and 
publish their opinions and can freely set up their association or political par­
ties. Such system wants a society which is organized around popular sover­
eignty and a concern for individual rights. The "new" DP aims to completely 
put an end to the control of the center-bureaucratic elite over the state and 
society. Furthermore, in doing so, it aims to reach a social consensus and 
reconciliation among governor and governed. It is all clear from the "new" 
DP's views that it challenges the bureaucratic structure shaped with Kemalist 
principles. Economic transformation, second significant target of the "new" 
DP, includes chiefly a commitment to the primacy of the free market rather 
than state policies, privatization of the public sector and deregulation. For the 
"new" DP, this liberal economic policies will bring the state control on econ­
omy, which has hindered the development of democracy, to an end. These 
views of the "new" DP about economy are to a large extent similar with both 
the MP's and the TPP's ideas. All these views of the "new" DP lead us to face 
a notion that its perception of democracy and democratic system appears
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familiar with liberal-pluralist democracy and with the approaches and ideas of 
the new right that the center-right politics in democratic societies depends 
upon. In addition to these, the "new" DP puts forward a new idea on the state 
that it has not already existed in Turkish politics. The state can not be an 
instrument of imposing any ideology on by people. This state is called as 
"referee-state" (hakem devlet). One may claim that its view on the state is 
tightly connected With the pluralist and liberal theoiy of the state which re­
quires a state acting as umpire or referee in order to arbitrate on the complex 
demand of heterogeneous society. In short, the "new" DP's views of politics - 
by an emphasis of the freedom of speech and of belonging to an identity, 
principles of representation, the system of contract, and political and cultural 
pluralism - is very much a part of liberal political theory.
What are the differences and similarities among the "new" DP, and the 
MP and the TPP? First main difference is their different perception of de­
mocracy. The "new" DP, newly emerging minor center-right party, entails a 
democracy necessitating a sort of liberal-pluralist democratic system and 
democratic society. As the opposite of the "new" DP, the MP and the TPP, in 
general, maintain some kind of populist and majoritarian sense of democracy 
which could be seen on a large scale in the views and policies of the "old" DP 
and the .IP. In such understanding of democracy linked by majoritarianism 
and pragmatism there was a powerful orientation to unmediated mass political 
participation, but not tolerance to sub-cultural and social groups, and to 
opposition. Unlike both center-right parties, the "new" DP sees political de­
mocracy as liberal-pluralist democratic system. Such basic difference, for ex­
ample, can be seen in their outlooks on sub-cultural and opposing groups, and 
socio-cultural minorities. Unlike the MI’ and the TPP, the "new" DP defends a
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societal system wliicli rests on cultural pluralism by which each ways of life 
should be allowed as it is the case in any particular pluralist society. This 
freedom guaranteed by the state will give a chance to all different sub-cultural 
groups to e.xpress themselves, to use their own language in education, training 
and broadcasting, and to choose whatsoever belief without encumbrance. By 
such opinions, it can be claimed, the "new" DP is profoundly differed from 
the TPP and the .VIP both of which, in most cases, put these groups under the 
care of guardian of the Republican official ideology basing on nationalism, 
laicisim, statism, republicanism, and populism. Because of believing the 
necessity of official ideology, the MP and the TPP sometimes set an obstacle 
to what people learn, what they believe and which identity they belong to, 
which are designated by the central bureaucratic organizations, in the name of 
Atatiirkism.
Other significant difference emerges in defining the position and func­
tions of the state; the "new" DP reformulates the state's position and functions 
by conceptualizing it as "referee-state" described in the previous parts. How­
ever, the TPP's and the MP's opinions on the state is not independent from 
the official ideology determined in accordance with Kemalist principles, 
while the MP and the TPP sometimes propose liberal policies contradicted 
with such Republican state ideology and its bureaucratic structure; for exam­
ple, their attempts for privatization are restricted by the bureaucratic elites. 
This state has emerged as an aLitonomous agent setting ideological parame­
ters. For "new" DP the slate should not dominate education which has been 
basic tool for imposing the official ideology, and not control the religion, Is­
lam, w hich should be ideologically autonomous. Civil societal organizations 
and voluntary association may perform the religious affairs, as in the western
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democracy. The "new" DP's understanding of religion also shapes its opinions 
on the secularism, which is possible at the level of the state, not necessarily 
needed at the level of individual. In opposing to the "new" DP, the MP and 
the TPP defend the idea of that the state is able to control religion and should 
perform religious affairs. Although the TPP and the MP believe the need of 
the state procuring welfare and social security policies, the "new" DP claims 
that the society can itself make the best for ensuring social security within 
"third sectors": civil organizations. This self-securing system, as for the "new" 
DP, is one of the significantly basic aspect to free the society from the 
guardianship of the state.
Main resemblance of the "new" DP with the TPP and the MP is their 
claim to be the owner of the heritage of the "old" DP. The views and path of 
the "new" DP is affected to a large extent by Adnan Menderes whose name 
has been mentioned with the multi-party system and by Ozal who brought 
forth liberal discourse starting to take up speed throughout emphasizing the 
primacy of individual to the state, refusing the state domination, etc. Besides, 
the "new" DP shares similar opinions with both parties (the MP and the TPP) 
in accepting conservative views basing on Islamic values in some sense, and 
in accepting liberal economic policies - in the sense of free enterprise and free 
market conditions, privatization, and reducing largely the role of the state in 
economy. Three political parties insist on desire and decision of people, or 
"national will", that is most fundamental determining factor in the works of 
parliament, and the policies of government and political parties. The "new" 
DP, like both the MP and the TPP, may be seen as a leader-based party, not 
alike cadre-party. Aydın Menderes is major leading figure in the emergence 
of the "new" DP as a different political party.
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İn fact, the "new" DP's conservative and nationalistic views, on a large 
scale, put it in a different position from the TPP and the MP. For a long time, 
in the views of the "new" DP, Islam has had importance in integrating Ana­
tolian people, and has made possible a harmony between them. According to 
its program, it is also important in attaining its goal of pluralist society. Yet, 
the "new" DP uses and applies most of the aspects and concepts of the west­
ern center-right politics concerning socio-economic functional pluralism, but 
we can say that such pluralism is very difficult to come about in Turkey 
where basic cleavage has been cultural rather than functional. It may be in­
ferred from the program of the "new" DP that, with reference to Islam, aiming 
pluralist society will base on Islamic-religious cultural pluralism rather than 
socio-economic pluralism existing in the class-structured western societies. 
As Reagan's and Thatcher's governments were the emphasis on traditional 
and moral conservatism for regulating broken social ties and relationships, 
Menderes puts forward the combination of Islam and nationalism which may 
provide needed socio-cultural harmony and consensus, through reference to 
the role of Islam in Anatolia in the past. This view of Menderes seem to be 
influenced from Ozal.
We can easily say that the "new" DP seems’to be to fit into most of the 
features of the center-right politics. On the other hand, the MP and the TPP, 
not fully accepting liberal-pluralist democratic values, can not respond the 
characteristics of a center-right political party, but their perception on democ­
racy bases on majoritarianism. This is due to the lack of sophistication in their 
ideological discourse caused by receiving less intellectual and academic 
support. This is the traditional weakness of Turkish right-wing politics; that 
is, Turkish center-right parties have not had a clear-cut ideology on the state
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and societal system. As opposite to them, the "new" DP has the approaches 
based on the complex set of ideological and theoretical framework. But, its 
approaches on the state and society supported with this ideological and theo­
retical framework do not reflect the reality of Turkey where there has been an 
extremely strong state tradition. This seems to be one of its weak side hin­
dering its growth. Unlike its political views, the other weak side of the "new" 
DP is that it seems as a leader-based party, as it is the case of other center- 
right parties.
Until the 198ÜS, Turkish center-right had provided alternative policies 
to the views of RPP which was commonly represented by the central bureau­
cratic elite. The center-right alternative was also a challenge to bureaucracy 
without injuring the basic theme of the Republican ideology. In the 1980s and 
early 1990s, within changing context of Turkey the growing power of the 
civil societal elements and different socio-cultural identities started being in­
fluential in Turkish politics. All political parties are forced to reregulate and 
redefine their ideologies in accordance with newly shaping political and social 
context. Although the political conjecture was suitable for further democ­
ratization, the.center-right parties did not take further steps toward democra­
tizing the parliamentary and majority level keeping their position which was 
quite conservative toward the issue. These political parties started to lose the 
legitimacy and power for taking radical decision and realizing reforms, and 
there existed a contradiction among their views and the demands of the soci­
ety. For this reason, the center-right and-left parties and bureaucracy seem to 
agree on resisting some pro-systemic alternatives; for instance, the center 
parties make coalitions against the Welfare Party and they oppose some re­
vival of cultural identities.
Under such circumstances, especially in the center-right, new tenden­
cies and search, aiming at forming a new movement or political party, began 
to emerge. Basic familiar feature of these movements and political parties is 
their being depended on liberalism which is one of the four enemies that is 
considered a challenge to national unity and the Republican ideology; others 
are communism, Islam and Kurdism. The threat of communism has been dis­
appeared, but other three are still rampart. It may be argued that, today, lib­
eralism exists as most fundamental challenge to the goals and rules of the 
Republican nation-state. It is because that central bureaucracy tutelage may be 
abolished within democratization of all spheres of life through liberal and 
pluralist values. New minor political parties and movements with their em­
phasis on liberal democracy which necessitates to a freedom to all groups and 
identities in the society through legitimizing them may be said as a threat to 
the bureaucratic structure and ideology of the Republican regime.
To this effect, we can say that, in Turkish political system, there are 
now clash and conflict between pluralist, liberal and conciliatory values, on 
the one hand, and centralist, bureaucratic and elitist values, on the other hand. 
This seems a new version of center-periphery drift, or conflict among populist 
or democrats and bureaucracy. As one of such new political parties, the "new" 
DP could be viewed as the one which manifests pluralist and liberal values 
since its leaders try to formulate a new political understanding particularly 
basing on political and cultural pluralism. But, I think that the possibility of 
spreading the views of the "new" DP needs a political culture resting on some 
aspects: participation, tolerance, political and cultural pluralism, and 
consensus, that they have not completely existed until now in Turkish politics 
and society. Lack of such political and social system that the "new" DP relies
1.1
on can be seen as a fLindamental obstacle to its development. And also, one 
can say that its ideology does not reflect the social and cultural structure of 
Turkish society in reality. In the near future, therefore, the "new" DP will not 
be able to be successful in gaining considerable popular support and in get­
ting located in the Turkish politics as a major political party.
In the early 1990s, Turkey is experiencing the orientation toward plu­
ralism, liberalism and decentralization, that can be seen as being congruent 
with evolving political sentiment within socio-economic and political devel­
opment. This orientation might gradually give rise to emerge race of a politi­
cal context necessitating democratic understanding, linking with the social 
contracts among dilierent identities. Within the context of such new trends, 
the Turkish politics and Turkish society need some political parties defending 
liberal-pluralistic notion of democracy.
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